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The Debt-Equity Labyrinth: A Case for 
the New Section 385 Regulations 
Alexander Lewitt* 
“Our present taxing system has become a labyrinth for the wary 
and unwary alike, filling endless volumes with its exceptions to 
exceptions, and indecipherable differentiations in the way we tax 
various sources of income.”1 
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I. Introduction 
Corporations routinely borrow money from subsidiaries, 
shareholders, and other related parties.2 This often occurs when 
they are in financial trouble and unrelated parties are reluctant to 
lend to them.3 In recent years, for example, Sears Holdings, Inc., 
parent company of iconic American retailers Sears and Kmart, 
borrowed hundreds of millions of dollars from hedge funds 
controlled by its chairman and largest shareholder, Edward 
Lampert, to fund massive losses.4 These types of related-party 
loans raise important tax questions regarding whether they should 
be characterized as debt or equity.5 Loans between related parties 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Christopher Matthews, The Next Big Thing in Corporate-Tax 
Avoidance, TIME (Apr. 3, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/04/03/the-next-big-
thing-in-corporate-tax-avoidance/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“U.S. multinational 
companies routinely set up units in low tax jurisdiction to pool cash from their 
global operations and lend to other parts of the business . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See SANDEEP DAHIYA, ANTHONY SAUNDERS & ANAND SRINIVASAN, 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND BANKING LENDING RELATIONSHIPS 25 (2002), 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/asaunder/Financial_Distress_and_Relationship_ban
kpap_Jan7_2002.pdf (“The risk of loan default is the one of the most important 
risks faced by banks.”). But see Daniel McNulty, Why Hedge Funds Love 
Distressed Debt, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
bonds/08/distressed-debt-hedge-fund.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (arguing that 
hedge funds love to invest in companies with distressed debt) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 4. See Antoine Gara, As Ailing Sears Bleeds Cash, Billionaire Eddie 
Lampert Increases Loans to Retailer, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2016, 11:22 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2016/08/25/as-ailing-sears-bleeds-cash-
billionaire-eddie-lampert-increases-loans-to-retailer/#6f07e786af36 (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2017) (“Sears reported yet another large quarterly loss and said Lampert 
will loan the company $300 million as it seeks to sell or divest brands . . . .”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 5. See Nathan Bomey, How Sears CEO Lampert Cashes In as Stores Cash 
Out, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2017, 4:24 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
money/2017/c3/22/sears-holdings-ceo-eddie-lampert/99487518/ (last visited Dec. 
7, 2017) (noting how Lampert is structuring transactions with Sears to have his 
$389 million in unsecured notes issued to Sears be treated as debt in anticipation 
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often involve different motives and terms than arm’s length loans 
and involve the potential for abuse.6 Even when related parties do 
not own a majority of a company’s stock, they may effectively sit in 
a position of control that allows them to manipulate events to their 
advantage.7 This is especially true in situations when companies 
are in financial distress and have limited options for raising 
capital.8 Related parties are willing to extend credit when 
unrelated parties are not because they face different consequences 
and can earn potential benefits that are not available to unrelated 
parties.9  This is an age-old problem that corporate taxpayers and 
the government wrestled over for decades.10 Corporations desire 
clarity with respect to tax rules and flexibility with respect to the 
ability to raise capital (especially when they are in financial 
trouble),11 while the government wants to prevent abuse of the tax 
                                                                                                     
of liquidation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See Art Berkowitz & Richard Rampell, Related-Party Transactions Can 
Be an Investment Red Flag, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2002, 6:37 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1030635386991264875 (last visited Feb. 27, 
2017) (“[Related-party transactions] aren’t necessarily wrong, but because of their 
delicate nature and the risk of abuse or fraud, they must be carefully scrutinized 
and usually fully disclosed.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 7. See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holding, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. 1979) 
(noting that control of 44.4% of a corporation’s stock “represented effective 
control”).  
 8. See infra Part VII.C (providing an example of this type of situation and 
applying the common law, the 1980 regulations, and 2016 regulations on how to 
distinguish debt from equity). 
 9. See Tong Yan & Wang Huacheng, Related Party Transactions, Benefits 
of Control and Earnings Quality, 2 FRONTIER BUS. RES. CHINA 187, 187 (2008) 
(concluding that “when the share ratio of controlling shareholder is less than 50%, 
they prefer pursuing private benefits of control via related party transactions”).  
 10. Compare William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of 
Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 412–530 
(1971) (outlining the various factors courts have taken into consideration in 
determining whether an instrument should be treated as debt or equity), with 
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980) (setting forth the various rules on how to 
distinguish debt from equity), and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T (2016) 
(prescribing rules on how to differentiate debt from equity). 
 11. See Kimberly Clausing, The Real (and Imagined) Problems with the U.S. 
Corporate Tax Code, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/the-
real-and-imagined-problems-with-the-u-s-corporate-tax-code (last visited Dec. 7, 
2017) (“The U.S. raises less corporate tax revenue than peer countries do, and the 
system is mind-numbingly complex, rife with distortion, and widely perceived to 
be unfair. The corporate community is also concerned that our current system 
inhibits competiveness, holding American companies back.”) (on file with the 
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laws by corporations trying to disguise equity investments as debt 
in order to take advantage of interest deductions or to create large 
tax carryforwards that increase their value to potential 
acquirers.12  
Take the example of Company A, which is on the verge of 
bankruptcy.13 It will not meet its next monthly payroll or other 
monthly obligations unless it immediately raises $100 million. It 
spoke to its banks, who are unwilling to extend it any further 
credit, and its investment bankers told it that the public markets 
are inhospitable to a public debt or equity offering. Its only option 
is to borrow money from a hedge fund, Vulture Hedge Fund, that 
accumulated its stock and, more importantly, its bonds at 
significant discounts to their face value. Vulture is willing to lend 
Company A $100 million on the following terms (subject to a 
binding written agreement): (1) a one-year loan with a fixed 
maturity date secured by all of Company A’s real estate; 
(2) interest payable monthly in arrears at an annual rate of ten 
percent with a five-day grace period, after which Vulture can 
demand immediate repayment of principal, declare an immediate 
default, and pursue its remedies as a creditor; (3) the loan is 
convertible into seventy-five percent of Company A’s stock in the 
event of default; (4) Vulture gets three of Company A’s seven board 
seats now and two more board seats upon default; and (5) Vulture 
is provided with access to monthly financial reports from the 
company and whatever other information it reasonably requests. 
The loan ranks senior to all of Company A’s existing debt and 
equity. At the time Vulture offers to make the loan, it owns 
thirty-five percent of Company A’s common stock and forty-five 
percent of its public bonds. While this does not constitute majority 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See Leslie Picker, Companies Hurt by Treasury Crackdown Win 
Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/ 
14/business/dealbook/exemptions-made-to-treasurys-tax-saving-restriction-rules. 
html?_r=1 (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“Part of the Treasury’s goal [in enacting 
Section 385] was to clamp down on a tax-saving strategy called earnings 
stripping, where the American subsidiary of an inverted company borrows money 
from its foreign parent and uses the interest payments on the loans to take a tax 
deduction.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. This example is taken up in more depth at the end of this Note. See infra 
Part VII.C (providing an analysis of how the common law, the 1980 regulations, 
and the 2016 regulations would characterize this example). 
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ownership, it effectively constitutes control. Having no alternative, 
Company A agrees to the deal.  The question is whether this loan 
should be characterized as debt or equity even though Vulture does 
not own a majority of Company A’s stock or bonds.  As we will see, 
bright-line rules fail to effectively address this type of real world 
situation and a flexible approach is needed to deal with the 
complexities of modern corporate finance. 
Part II of this Note provides background information on ways 
the government has attempted to distinguish debt from equity.14 
Part III offers a primer on why corporations choose to finance their 
operations with debt.15 Part IV details how the courts have dealt 
with determining whether an instrument should be considered 
debt or equity prior to 1980.16 Part V discusses how the Treasury 
Department’s 1980 regulations determined an instrument’s status 
as either debt or equity.17 Part VI describes the 2016 regulations, 
which were issued to make the same determination.18 Part VII 
provides illustrative examples of debt-financed companies 
(including Company A) to show how the common law, the 1980 
regulations, and the 2016 regulations would affect each example 
differently, for better or worse.19 Next, Part VIII argues that the 
2016 regulations are an appropriate response to the debt-equity 
issue.20 Part VIII also notes that although the 2016 regulations are 
an appropriate response, there is still room for improvement 
within the regulations.21 Finally, Part IX proposes targeted 
improvements for the regulations and recommendations for how 
corporations can deal with this issue.22  
                                                                                                     
 14. Infra Part II. 
 15. Infra Part III. 
 16. Infra Part IV. 
 17. Infra Part V. 
 18. Infra Part VI. 
 19. Infra Part VII. 
 20. Infra Part VIII. 
 21. Infra Part VIII. 
 22. Infra Part IX. 
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II. Background 
Since the inception of the interest deduction,23 the courts,24 
Congress,25 and the Treasury Department26 all tried to address 
situations like Company A’s with inconsistent results. Until 2016, 
the government relegated this problem to the courts.27 Due to a 
lack of guidelines regarding how to distinguish debt from equity,28 
the common law produced multi-factored tests.29 The courts’ use of 
these multi-factored tests resulted in inconsistent outcomes based 
on balancing the relevant facts of each case.30 Concerned with the 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Payne-Aldrich Act, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113 (1909) (current 
version at 26 U.S.C. § 163 (2012)) (allowing a corporation to deduct “interest 
actually paid within the year on its bonded or other indebtedness”). Originally, a 
corporation was limited to deducting interest on debt in an amount of debt that 
was equal to the amount of money a corporation received from its shareholders in 
exchange for shares of stock. See id. (limiting the amount of interest deductions a 
corporation could take within a given year). Congress eliminated this limitation 
in 1918. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1057, 1077 
(eliminating the limitation on the amount of debt a corporation could deduct).  
 24. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 369 (revealing how the courts have dealt 
historically with the debt-equity debacle).  
 25. See S. REP. NO.  91-552, at 106 (1969) (agreeing with the House that “it 
is appropriate to specifically authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe 
the appropriate rules for distinguishing debt from equity”). 
 26. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980); Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T (2016).  
 27. Although legislation was passed that gave the Treasury Department the 
authority to prescribe regulations to distinguish debt from equity in 1969, 
regulations never achieved full affect until 2016. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. 
L. No. 91–172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 487, 613 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 385 
(2012)) (delegating to the Secretary of the Treasury Department the authority to 
prescribe regulations that distinguish debt from equity); T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 
69 (withdrawing the 1980 proposed regulations); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T 
(2016) (enacting final regulations).  
 28. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 369 n.4, n.8 (noting the lack of a statutory 
definition and the Court’s reluctance to define equity or debt); Lawrence M. Stone 
& C. Kevin McGeehan, Distinguishing Corporate Debt from Stock Under Section 
385, 36 TAX L. REV. 341, 344 (1981) (“Despite the importance of this distinction, 
the Code contains no definition of either stock or debt.”).  
 29. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 407 (mentioning that courts have 
“habitually recite[d] a varying list of as many as 16 criteria or factors to be 
considered”). 
 30. See id. at 408 (“In consequence, it has justly been said that the courts are 
at liberty to arrive at opposite results on identical facts depending upon their own 
whims as to which factors they wish to stress . . . .” (quoting Stuart M. Weis, The 
Labyrinth of the Thin Corporation, 40 TAXES 568, 589 (1962))).  
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lack of a bright-line rule, Congress enacted provisions to address 
the issue in the Tax Reform Act of 1969,31 which gave the Secretary 
of the Treasury Department authority to prescribe regulations to 
classify instruments as either debt or equity.32 
The Treasury Department did not exercise its express 
administrative authority in this area until 1980, when it issued 
final regulations under § 385 (1980 regulations).33 That exercise 
was far from successful.34 The main criticism of the 1980 
regulations concerned their complexity.35 Fortunately for critics, 
the regulations’ effective date was delayed until 1983, when the 
Treasury Department withdrew them altogether.36 The stated 
reason for the Treasury Department’s decision was that the 
proposed regulations did “not fully represent the position of the 
Treasury or Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) on matters 
concerning debt and equity.”37 While the Treasury Department’s 
stated reason left many unanswered questions, some viewed the 
                                                                                                     
 31. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 487, 
613 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 385 (2012)) (adding § 385 to the I.R.C.).   
 32. See id. (authorizing the Treasury Department to “prescribe such 
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest 
in a corporation is to be treated . . . as stock or indebtedness”).  
 33. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980) (issuing for the first 
time regulations to distinguish debt from equity).  
 34. The Treasury Department regulations were postponed multiple times 
before ultimately being withdrawn. See id. § 1.385-1(a)(1) (“The regulations under 
section 385 apply . . . after April 30, 1981”); T.D. 7774, 1981-1 C.B. 168 (amending 
the regulations to apply after December 31, 1981); T.D. 7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60 
(extending the regulations effective date to June 30, 1982); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.385-1(a)(1) (as amended by T.D. 7822 in 1982) (postponing the regulations 
effective date until after comments are incorporated into a final rule); T.D. 7920, 
1983-2 C.B. 69 (withdrawing the regulations).  
 35. See, e.g., Stone & McGeehan, supra note 28, at 392 (questioning how the 
problems surrounding the classification of an instrument as either debt or equity 
can be resolved with these complex and comprehensive provisions); Felix B. 
Laughlin, The Debt-Equity Regulations (Section 385), 28 WM. & MARY ANN. TAX 
CONF. 9, 30 (1982) (noting that the rules “have been criticized as being overly 
complex”); Jack S. Levin & Stephen S. Bowen, The Section 385 Regulations 
Regarding Debt Versus Equity: Is the Cure Worse than the Malady?, 35 TAX LAW. 
1, 41 (1982) (“It can only be hoped that the Secretary or the Congress will 
ultimately realize that more law does not always mean more certainty, and will 
take steps to simplify these regulations.”). 
 36. See T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69 (providing for the withdrawal of the 1980 
final regulations).  
 37. Id.  
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decision to withdraw the regulations as an implicit recognition of 
their flaws.38 Thirty-three years later in 2016, under the Obama 
administration, the Treasury Department issued proposed 
regulations under § 385.39 The new Proposed Regulations were 
initially very broad in scope,40 yet when promulgating final 
regulations under § 385, the Treasury Department substantially 
restricted their scope.41 
III. Debt Financing 
Corporations can choose to finance their business operations 
by issuing either bonds or stocks, or both.42 A corporate bond 
represents a debt instrument that is held by a creditor.43 Notes 
                                                                                                     
 38. See, e.g., James J. Tobin, Proposed § 385 Regulations Go Way Too Far, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.bna.com/proposed-385-
regulations-n73014446402/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“Treasury issued proposed 
and final regulations under § 385 in 1980 that were subsequently withdrawn, 
presumably after recognition of their many problems.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 39. The Obama administration’s motive in finalizing regulations under § 385 
was because of tax inversion and earning stripping transactions. See Reuters, 
Republicans Want the Obama Administration to Delay Corporate Inversion Rules, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 6, 2016, 7:46 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/10/06/republicans-
obama-administration-corporate-inversion-rules/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) 
(disclosing that the proposed regulations were issued as “part of the Obama 
administration’s effort to stop a wave of tax inversion mergers”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-4, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912 
(April 8, 2016); Victor Fleischer, On Inversions, the Treasury Department Drops 
the Gloves, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/ 
business/dealbook/on-inversions-the-treasury-department-drops-the-gloves.html?_r=0 
(last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“The proposed regulations are . . . aggressive and 
expansive . . .  .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 41. See Wade Sutton, Donald Trump, Section 385, and Consolidated Groups, 
44 J. CORP. TAX’N 33, 33 (2017) (noting that many of the issues associated with the 
proposed regulations “have been satisfactorily addressed in the final rules”). 
Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-4, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912 (April 8, 2016) 
(giving the Treasury Department broad discretion to treat instruments as either 
debt or equity), with Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T (2016) (cutting back on the 
proposed regulations).  
 42. See Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best 
World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (2000) (“Corporations finance their operations 
by raising debt and equity capital.”). 
 43. See id. at 1059 n.5 (describing the terminology for debt instruments). 
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refer to short term loans made by lenders to a corporation.44 Bonds 
refer to long term loans (i.e., for a period of five or more years).45 A 
debt instrument is governed by a contract between borrower and 
lender that sets forth the terms of the loan (often called a “Note” 
or an “Indenture”). Typically, the debt contract sets forth the 
stated term of the bond, a maturity date, the amount the corporate 
issuer is obligated to pay on the maturity date, and the interest 
rate paid to the holder throughout the term of the bond.46 A 
corporation that chooses to finance its operations through the 
issuance of bonds must pay interest, whether stated or effective, 
on the bonds to the bondholder.47 Under the Internal Revenue 
Code (I.R.C.), corporations can deduct the interest payments on the 
bond from taxable income.48 Dividends paid to shareholders do not 
reduce the corporation’s taxable income.49 
If a corporation issues stock instead of debt, the shareholder 
becomes an equity owner of the corporation.50 A corporation that 
issues stocks is not required to pay dividends to stockholders.51 
Rather, cash distributions on equity generally rest within the 
discretion of the corporate board after considering the need for and 
potential use of retained earnings.52 Often, corporations may 
choose to finance operations through debt financing because it 
                                                                                                     
 44. Id.  
 45. See id. (defining bonds).  
 46. See id. at 1059 n.5 (giving the characteristics of a typical bond). 
 47. See id. at 1060 (explaining debt financing). 
 48. I.R.C. § 163(a) (2012); see also Pratt, supra note 42, at 1061 (delineating 
the different tax consequences of debt financing and equity financing).  
 49. See Pratt, supra note 42, at 1061 (“[A] corporation . . . cannot deduct the 
dividends it pays on the shares it issues.”).   
 50. See Equity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/e/equity.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“In finance, you can think of equity 
as one’s degree ownership in any asset after all debts associated with that asset 
are paid off.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 51. See Pratt, supra note 42, at 1061 (noting that a corporation can retain 
earnings instead of paying out earnings in the form of dividends). 
 52. See Leonard Chazen, How the Influx of Dividend-Minded Shareholders 
Will Impact Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REG. (NOV. 22, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/22/how-the-influx-
of-dividend-minded-shareholders-will-impact-shareholder-activism/ (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2017) (examining the role of the board of directors in making dividend 
payments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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reduces a corporation’s tax liability and reduces their net cost of 
capital.53  
IV. The Common Law 
In the early years of dealing with the issue of whether a 
financial instrument constituted debt or equity, courts addressed 
the issue by looking to “the four corners of the instrument.”54 This 
“four corners” approach ultimately failed because courts had 
difficulty dealing with hybrid securities and intracompany loans 
made by shareholders.55 In response, courts developed multi-factor 
tests to aid in making a determination under the “four corners” 
approach.56 Nevertheless, these factors failed to provide a bright-
line rule because courts varied on the number of factors used57 and 
the weight of those factors.58 In reviewing the problems 
encountered by the courts, some patterns can be identified from 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Pratt, supra note 42, at 1062–64 (summarizing the differences 
between debt and equity financing by way of example). Although the use of debt 
financing has its advantages, it also has its disadvantages. See Claire 
Boyte-White, How Does a Company Choose Between Debt and Equity in Its 
Capital Structure?, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 25, 2015, 1:11 PM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032515/how-does-company-choose-
between-debt-and-equity-its-capital-structure.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“The 
downside of debt financing is that lenders require the payment of interest, 
meaning the total amount repaid exceeds the initial sum. In addition, payments 
on debt must be made regardless of business revenue.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 54. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 405–06 (observing that courts initially 
relied on the text of an instrument “to draw the distinction that the law 
required”).  
 55. See id. at 406–07 (discussing the difficulties courts encountered by 
taking the four corners approach). 
 56. For a complete list of factors courts habitually utilized, see Fin Ray 
Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968) (listing sixteen 
factors courts have taken into consideration in the Third Circuit) and Estate of 
Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972) (highlighting thirteen 
factors courts in the Fifth Circuit have taken into consideration).  
 57. Compare Mixon, 464 F.2d at 402 (indexing thirteen factors), with Fin 
Ray Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 696 (specifying sixteen factors), and Anchor Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co. v. C.I.R., 93 T.C. 382, 400 (1989) (finding eleven factors). 
 58. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 408 (“[I]t has justly been said, that the 
courts are at liberty to arrive at opposite results on identical facts depending upon 
their own whims as to which factors they wish to stress . . . .” (quoting Stuart M. 
Weis, The Labyrinth of the Thin Corporation, 40 TAXES 568, 589 (1962))).  
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their application.59 These patterns divide into three criteria 
regarding whether an instrument constitutes debt or equity: 
formal rights and remedies of creditors, objective determination of 
intent, and risk and economic reality.60 
A. Formal Rights and Remedies of Creditors 
Courts identified the following formal rights and remedies of 
creditors as characteristics of debt instruments: a fixed maturity 
date, remedies for default, subordination, certainty of income, 
absence or inadequacy of interest payments, participation in both 
success and failure of the business, participation in control of the 
business, and the name of the instrument.61 Courts considered the 
presence of a fixed maturity date a critical factor.62 While a fixed 
maturity date alone was insufficient to ensure treatment as debt,63 
the absence of a fixed maturity date was “most often conclusive” of 
equity treatment.64 A fixed maturity date was lacking if the courts 
found an instrument to have no reasonable expectation of 
repayment in the future or if the courts found an unreasonable 
postponement of payment.65  
Another important factor weighing in favor of equity 
treatment was the absence of a right to force payment upon 
default.66 Generally, subordination of a debt to other creditors 
supported a finding of equity treatment, whereas a 
                                                                                                     
 59. See id. at 411–12 (providing a list of typical evidentiary factors employed 
by courts).   
 60. See id. (dividing the evidentiary factors into four sections).  
 61. See id. (listing the factors most commonly identified by the courts).   
 62. See id. at 413 (“The most important of the formal factors is a provision 
for a fixed . . . time when the purported creditor is unconditionally entitled to 
require payment of the principal.”). 
 63. See id. (“The presence of a maturity date does not guarantee recognition 
of indebtedness, if other factors indicate an equity investment . . . .”).  
 64. Id.; see also Lane v. United States, 742 F.2d 1311, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 
1984) (analyzing the absence of a fixed maturity date under the multi-factored 
common law test). 
 65. Reasonableness was determined by a subjective evaluation of the 
particular circumstances of a corporation. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 415–16 
(clarifying reasonableness). 
 66. See id. at 420 (revealing that this finding “is a very significant, if not 
essential factor”).  
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non-subordinated debt supported a finding of debt treatment.67 
Courts gave participation in management or control of the 
corporation little weight.68 
A debtholder is entitled to interest payments on a loan.69 A 
court’s finding that interest was payable regardless of whether it 
was “dependent upon a discretionary determination by the board 
of directors” helped establish the existence of a debt.70 Typically 
where there was no or inadequate interest, courts treated the 
purported debt instrument as equity.71 
Courts found a purported debt instrument that makes 
repayment of principal contingent on the success of the venture 
akin to an equity investment in the corporation.72 As such, courts 
considered those types of arrangements to support a finding of 
equity treatment.73 Labeling an instrument debt does not 
                                                                                                     
 67. With respect to subordination, “the financial community regards 
subordinated debt as quasi-equity.” Id. at 422. As a result, the holder of a 
subordinated debt was not seen as having rights significantly different from that 
of a preferred stockholder. See id. (noting this factor as one that “strongly 
indicates that the holders were sharing in the risk of the venture in a manner 
more compatible with the status of stockholders than creditors”). Usually 
subordination was determined at the time the instrument was issued. Id. at 423. 
Where there is a finding of subordination as one of a number of factors leading to 
treating an instrument as equity, courts have failed to recognize an instrument 
as equity. See id. at 426 (“Frequently, the courts will justify any degree of 
subordination, on the ground that it was necessary in order to meet . . . capital 
requirements or to facilitate outside financing and credit . . . .”). A finding of 
subordination, however, is not itself enough to cause a court to treat an 
instrument as equity. See id. at 423–24 (noting that although subordinated debt 
is similar in priority to preferred stock, it may differ significantly). Therefore, in 
weighing the multitude of factors, the weight given to subordination varies. See 
id. at 421–27 (detailing the varying weight courts have given to subordination).  
 68. See id. at 447–49 (describing that “it is all but impossible to find a 
decision in which [participation in control] has been applied”).  
 69. See id. at 431 (furnishing that interest payments in some form are a 
common attribute of debt).   
 70. Id. Moreover, “some cases hold otherwise if the interest will become 
absolutely payable at a fixed ultimate maturity date.” Id.  
 71. See id. at 433–34 (observing how courts have dealt with a lack of or 
failure to pay interest rates). 
 72. See id. at 442 (explaining that a purported debt instrument that seeks 
payment based on a percentage of profits or sales “lacks even the form of a debt”).  
 73. See id. (stating that these types of arrangements are “generally viewed 
as resulting in a proprietary investment in the risk of the business, a device 
adopted in order to share the financial results of the operations along with the 
shareholders”).  
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conclusively support a finding of debt, but a lack thereof, such as 
labeling an instrument preferred stock, supports a finding of 
equity.74 
B. Objective Determination of Intent 
Courts identified the following factors as bearing on the 
intention to create a debtor-creditor relationship: formal 
documentation, security and sinking fund provisions, 
proportionality, guarantees by shareholders, payment history, and 
failure to enforce a default.75 Courts that assessed intent focused 
on the particular facts and circumstances that bore on each 
particular case.76 
Neither formal documentation of an unconditional promissory 
note or bond, nor treatment of an instrument as a liability on a 
corporation’s balance sheet, “can obscure the substance of the 
transaction.”77 The failure of a corporation to formally document 
an instrument as debt presented a strong indication of equity 
treatment.78 The presence of a valid security interest that placed 
the lender in a position superior to general creditors supported a 
finding of debt.79 In contrast, the absence of a security interest did 
not support a conclusive finding of equity.80 The absence of a 
                                                                                                     
 74. See id. at 450 (“If an instrument is labeled ‘preferred stock,’ the taxpayer 
has very little chance of getting it treated as debt . . . .”).  
 75. See id. at 412 (indexing the various factors courts used to establish 
whether an intention to create a debtor-creditor relationship existed).  
 76. See id. at 458 (“[M]ost courts today would agree that the characterization 
of purported debt for tax purposes must be determined . . . [by looking at] the 
intent as objectively ascertained by looking beneath mere form to all relevant 
facts and circumstances.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 77. Id. at 461. 
 78. See id. at 462 (observing that “failure of the taxpayer to follow form may 
well be used as evidence that debt was not intended”). This factor is a precursor 
to the documentation requirements in the 2016 Regulations that disqualify an 
instrument from being treated as a debt instrument if the parties do not 
thoroughly document the terms of the instrument. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2 
(2016) (setting forth the documentation requirements).  
 79. See id. at 466 (adding that this evidence is “powerful”). 
 80. Some courts have found this failure to be merely “a permissible 
subordination of the debt, to certain other creditors and purchasers.” Id. at 467. 
Other courts have found it to be “evidence of a lack of a bona fide intention to 
create a debt.” Id.  
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sinking fund also did not conclusively support a finding of equity 
treatment, although the presence of a sinking fund provided strong 
evidence for a finding of debt treatment.81  
With respect to proportionality, a finding of a purported debt 
held in substantial proportion to corporate stock created a strong 
inference of equity treatment.82 Some courts only used this to 
support a finding of equity treatment if there were other 
significant factors present.83 In contrast, when a court found a 
purported debt to be held disproportionately to the corporate stock, 
the court usually respected the instrument as debt.84 The courts 
typically considered an instrument as debt when capital was 
extended by an outside creditor of the corporation, was guaranteed 
by shareholders to satisfy a general policy of a lender, and whose 
proceeds were used to prevent deterioration of assets of the 
corporation through salary or dividend payments.85  
Timely repayment of a bond was considered evidence of an 
intent to create a debt.86 Repayment of debt did not support this 
intent if offset by new advances, advances made for temporary 
purposes, advances made to equalize advances of different 
shareholders, if repayment was determined by the cash needs of 
the corporation and shareholders rather than pursuant to a 
binding obligation,87 or if payments were precipitated by a tax 
audit.88 Some courts found the existence of an intent to repay the 
debt only if a corporation made faithful payments of interest when 
                                                                                                     
 81. See id. at 469 (“The absence of a sinking fund or some form of reserve to 
provide for the ultimate retirement of purported debt is often referred to as 
evidence of the lack of an unconditional intent that the obligation be repaid . . . .”). 
 82. See id. at 470 (describing the importance of such a finding as “very 
pertinent” and one which gives rise to a “strong inference”).  
 83. See id. at 471 (“But ordinarily there must be ‘something more,’ . . . to 
support the inference that the shareholder did not really intend to act like a 
creditor.”).  
 84. See id. at 473 (“The farther we get from proportionality, the more respect 
is paid to the form in which the parties have cast their arrangement.”).  
 85. See id. at 487 (finding that the “decisions have turned to a large extent 
on the finding that the creditor’s insistence upon a guaranty did not signify that 
the corporate capital was thought to be inadequate, but reflected a general policy 
of banks”).  
 86. See id. at 490–91 (specifying this factor is “persuasive”).  
 87. Id. at 491. 
 88. Id. at 492.  
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earnings were lacking.89 On the other hand, “[t]he significance of 
payment of interest as evidence of intention is limited when the 
corporation has earnings, which could as readily have been paid 
out as dividends.”90 
Failure to enforce a default was strong evidence of a lack of 
intent to establish a debtor-creditor relationship, especially if the 
creditor allowed extended defaults in principal payments, 
continued advances after multiple defaults, unreasonably 
extended the maturity date, or deferred a demand for payment.91 
These failures were evidence of a “state of mind . . . akin to that of 
an ordinary shareholder who understands that his investment is 
subject to the risks of the venture.”92 Defaults on the payment of 
interest were seen as less significant than principal defaults.93 The 
failure to make interest payments completely, paying interest at a 
corporation’s convenience, or creditors making interest payments 
themselves, supported findings of equity.94 In assessing this factor, 
courts took into consideration the intent of the parties not only at 
the time of the loan but also at the time of default.95 
C. Risk and Economic Reality 
Courts overlooked debt formalities and the intent of the 
parties if the economic reality of the arrangement did not comport 
with the creation of a debt instrument.96 In determining economic 
reality, courts looked at the adequacy of capitalization, the source 
of repayments, the use of funds advanced, and the willingness of 
an independent creditor to advance funds on comparable terms.97 
                                                                                                     
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.   
 91. Id. at 493. 
 92. Id. at 493–94. 
 93. Id. at 494. 
 94. Id.  
 95. See id. at 496 (“Even if the requisite intention to be a true creditor existed 
at the outset, enlarged needs of the business or other altered circumstances may 
bring about a change in the intention, . . . and what was once a debt may thus be 
transformed into an equity investment.”). 
 96. See id. at 503 (revealing that purported debts may not be respected if 
economic realities point to a sham).  
 97. See id. at 412 (recording the evidentiary factors court take into 
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Courts considered a corporation’s capitalization, as evidenced 
by its debt-to-equity ratio, important, but not conclusive, in 
distinguishing debt from equity.98 Since balance sheets do not 
always represent the true value of the assets available for debt 
repayment, courts looked further to determine if repayment of a 
purported debt was expected from other sources, such as 
off-balance sheet assets, balance sheet assets carried at values 
below their true market value, and profits or free cash flow, that 
showed a creditor expected to be repaid from these sources.99 A 
court was more likely to treat an instrument as equity rather than 
debt if a corporation expected repayment primarily or exclusively 
from the liquidation of assets.100 If the funds were used to purchase 
“core assets” of a business, a court was more likely to consider them 
equity rather than debt.101  But if an independent party would have 
advanced the funds on similar terms, a court was more likely to 
find that the advance was debt rather than equity.102  
V. The 1980s Approach  
On December 31, 1980, the Treasury Department issued final 
regulations under § 385 of the Internal Revenue Code.103 The 
Treasury Department sought to create bright-line rules that were 
largely absent under the common law.104 Initially the regulations 
                                                                                                     
consideration). 
 98. See id. at 510 (noting that the courts came to realize that “an amount of 
equity capital that would be inadequate to launch a corporation in one industry 
may be quite sufficient by the standards of another, and that within one industry 
the standard may vary with the type of operation planned”).   
 99. See id. at 513–20 (discussing how courts analyzed the debt-to-equity 
ratios of corporations).  
 100. See id. at 526 (“If the uncertainties of successful operation are such that 
only reasonably assured source of funds for repayment, at maturity or within a 
reasonable time, is the liquidation of the enterprise, a strong inference arises that 
no such drastic action would be contemplated by the purported creditor.”). 
 101. See id. (pointing out that in the case of a corporation formed to sell real 
estate,“the very business of the corporation is the liquidation of its assets”).  
 102. See id. at 530–35 (explaining the independent creditor test).  
 103. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980).  
 104. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385, 45 Fed. Reg. 18957, 18958 (Mar. 24, 1980) 
(“The question of whether an instrument in a corporation is stock or indebtedness 
has created considerable difficulties and led to much litigation.”).  
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were not scheduled to take effect until April 30, 1981.105 Because 
of the controversy fomented by these regulations, however, the 
Treasury Department continuously extended the deadline for their 
application until January 1, 1983.106 Finally, on November 3, 1983, 
the Treasury Department withdrew the regulations 
retroactively.107 Although these regulations never took effect, they 
illustrate how the Treasury Department overreached by trying to 
apply a rules-based approach to an area of corporate taxation that 
requires flexibility and the ability to focus on substance over 
form.108  
A. Scope 
The regulations issued in 1980 would have applied to all 
financial instruments,109 including preferred stock,110 some 
unwritten obligations,111 and guaranteed loans.112 All other 
interests113 were outside the scope of the regulations and were 
treated as equity or debt under applicable principles of existing 
common law.114  
                                                                                                     
 105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(a) (1980) (supplying the effective date).  
 106. See T.D. 7774, 1981-1 C.B. 168 (extending the effective date of the 
regulations from May 1, 1981, to January 1, 1982); T.D. 7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60 
(changing the effective date of the regulations from January 1, 1982 to July 1, 
1982). 
 107. See T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69 (notifying taxpayers of the withdrawal of 
the 1980 regulations).  
 108. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980).  
 109. See id. § 1.385-3(c) (defining “instruments” as “any bond, note, 
debenture, or similar written evidence of an obligation”).  
 110. See id. § 1.385-2(e)(4) (providing that § 1.385-10 contains rules 
pertaining to the treatment of purported preferred stock).  
 111. See id. § 1.385-2(e)(1) (noting that § 1.385-7 contains rules “that apply to 
certain loans of money made to a corporation by persons other than independent 
creditors that are not evidenced by an instrument within six months after the day 
they are made”).  
 112. See id. § 1.385-2(e)(3) (“Section 1.385-9 contains rules that apply to loans 
made to a corporation and guaranteed by a shareholder.”).  
 113. See, e.g., id. § 1.385-1(b)(1) (setting forth a few examples of what 
constitutes other interests, “such as bank deposits, insurance policies, claims for 
wages, and trade accounts payable”).  
 114. Id. § 1.385-1(b)(1).  
THE DEBT-EQUITY LABYRINTH 2299 
B. Preliminary Rules 
To understand the substantive rules set forth in the 
regulations it is necessary to lay out three operational rules that 
would have applied to more than one instrument classification. 
The first operational rule is the determination of the fair market 
value of an instrument.115 The second is the calculation of the 
debt-to-equity ratios.116 The third is the determination of a 
reasonable interest rate.117  
1. Fair Market Value of an Instrument 
Understanding fair market value is critical for three reasons. 
First, it aids in determining the proper classification of a hybrid 
instrument when holdings of stock and instruments are not in 
substantial proportion.118 Second, it facilitates the determination 
of whether the consideration paid for an instrument is excessive or 
inadequate.119 Finally, it assists in ascertaining whether a 
substantive change occurred in the terms of an instrument.120 
The regulations defined the fair market value of an 
instrument as “the price at which it would change hands between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge 
of all relevant facts.”121 To provide clarity, the regulations 
suggested that, in determining fair market value, a taxpayer may 
                                                                                                     
 115. See Jesse V. Boyles & Randolph J. Rush, The Regulations under Section 
385: A Review, Evaluation, and Suggested Approach, 27 VILL. L. REV. 52, 66 (1981) 
(laying forth the three operational rules of the 1980 § 385 regulations). 
 116. Id. at 67–74. 
 117. See id. at 74–82 (asserting why corporations need to ascertain a 
reasonable rate of interest). 
 118. Id. at 66; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) (1980) (laying forth the special 
rules for determining whether a hybrid instrument is held in substantial 
proportionality to stock). 
 119. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 66; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) 
(1980) (prescribing the proper method in calculating excessive or inadequate 
consideration). 
 120. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 66; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j) 
(1980) (presenting what constitutes a change in terms).  
 121. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(i) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note 
115, at 66 (reiterating the definition of fair market value).  
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use present value and standard bond tables under the § 1232 
regulations.122 The regulations also set forth two rules of 
convenience to help accommodate taxpayers.123 The first rule 
provided that the fair market value of a straight debt instrument 
is equal to the face amount if the interest rate is reasonable124 and 
the amount “paid for the instrument is equal to the face value.”125 
The second rule provided that the fair market value of an 
instrument registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and sold for cash to the public is the issue price.126 
When determining the fair market value of an instrument or the 
reasonableness of an interest rate, the Treasury Department, 
however, could disregard a non-commercial term of the 
instrument.127 
2. Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
Understanding and calculating a corporation’s debt-to-equity 
ratio was important in determining whether a particular rate of 
interest was reasonable under the substantial proportionality 
rules,128 whether a corporation had excessive debt under the 
substantial proportionality rules,129 and whether a corporation had 
excessive debt in determining the proper classification of 
                                                                                                     
 122. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(ii) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note 
115, at 67 (restating the regulations).  
 123. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note 
115, at 67 (laying out the two rules of convenience).  
 124. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(i)(A) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra 
note 115, at 67 (disclosing that reasonableness for the stated annual rate of 
interest is determined under § 1.385-6(e)). 
 125. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(i)(B) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra 
note 115, at 67 (clarifying the rule of convenience for fair market value). 
 126. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(ii) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note 
115, at 67 (noting that issue price is “defined in section 1232(b)(2)”).  
 127. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 67. This finding may only be made “if 
the principal purpose of the inclusion of the term is to increase or decrease the 
fair market value of the instrument (or a reasonable rate of interest for the 
instrument).” Treas. Reg.  § 1.385-3(b)(1)(iii)(A) (1980). 
 128. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 67; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2) 
(1980) (clarifying when a reasonable rate of interest will be found).  
 129. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 67; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(1) 
(1980) (specifying that if a debt is excessive then it will be treated as stock).  
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unwritten obligations.130 The regulations defined a corporation’s 
debt-to-equity ratio as: “[T]he corporation’s liabilities (excluding 
trade accounts payable, accrued operating expenses and taxes, and 
other similar items) bear to . . . [t]he stockholder’s equity.”131 
Stockholder’s equity was defined as a corporation’s excess of the 
adjusted basis of its assets over its liabilities.132 The regulations 
required the use of proper accounting principles in determining the 
adjusted basis of a corporation’s assets (which is needed to 
determine stockholder’s equity) and the amount of its liabilities, 
excluding treatment of any interest as equity or indebtedness by 
reason of § 385.133 Preferred stock is a liability, however, if under 
§ 385, it is treated as indebtedness.134  
The debt-to-equity ratio analysis is incomplete because it fails 
to take into account off-balance sheet assets that have substantial 
value,135 as well as the value of intangible assets carried on the 
balance sheet at less than their fair market value.136 As a result, it 
provides an inadequate analysis of solvency and a corporation’s 
ability to repay an instrument as of the time it enters into an 
obligation.137  
                                                                                                     
 130. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 67; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(b)(2) 
(1980) (“A loan to which this section applies is treated as a contribution to capital 
if the debtor corporation has excessive debt when the loan is made (under the 
principles of § 1.385-6(f)).”).  
 131. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(1) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note 
115, at 67 (restating the definition of a corporation’s debt-to-equity ratio).  
 132. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(2) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note 
115, at 68 (restating the definition of stockholder’s equity).  
 133. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 68; see also Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.385-6(g)(3)(i) (1980) (setting forth the operating rules for determining the 
adjusted basis of a corporation’s assets and the amount of a corporation’s 
liabilities).   
 134. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 68; see also Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.385-6(g)(3)(ii) (1980) (establishing the effects of classifying indebtedness as 
preferred stock under § 385).  
 135. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, 
FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS 129 (6th ed. 2013) (1997) (giving four 
examples of off-balance sheet financing arrangements in which corporations 
engage). 
 136. See id. at 236 (“[E]conomic goodwill . . . is never recorded on a balance 
sheet.”).  
 137. See Michael C. Thomsett, Why Companies’ Balance Sheets Can Be 
Misleading, MINT LIFE: BLOG (OCT. 19, 2010), 
https://blog.mint.com/investing/balance-sheet-10192010/ (last visited Feb. 27, 
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3. Reasonable Rate of Interest 
Identifying a reasonable rate of interest was essential for four 
reasons. First, it aided in determining whether an instrument 
issued for property other than money should be classified as equity 
or debt.138 Second, it facilitated the determination of whether the 
rule of convenience under § 1.385-3(b) applies in determining the 
fair market value of the instrument.139 Third, it helped in assessing 
whether a demand instrument should be classified as equity or 
debt under § 1.385-6(l)(1).140 Fourth, it supported a finding of 
whether a demand instrument or certain other obligations, as 
defined in § 1.385-7(a), classified as debt may be reclassified as 
equity.141  
The regulations provided that a reasonable interest rate is 
determined based on industry standards.142 Further, the 
regulations provided greater ease of compliance by setting forth a 
rule of convenience. The rule of convenience considers an interest 
rate reasonable if equal to: (1) the rate in effect under § 6621;143 
(2) the prime rate in effect under any local bank; (3) “a rate 
determined from time to time by the Secretary taking into 
consideration the average yield on outstanding marketable 
obligations of the United States of comparable maturity”; or (4) a 
                                                                                                     
2017) (“A disturbing reality about financial statements is that they are inherently 
inaccurate and incomplete.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 138. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 74; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d)(1) 
(1980) (describing what occurs when an instrument not issued for money is 
treated as equity).   
 139. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 74; see also Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.385-3(b)(2)(i) (1980) (providing the rule of convenience for determining fair 
market value).  
 140. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 74; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(l)(1) 
(1980) (supplying rules for the initial classification of an instrument payable on 
demand).  
 141. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 74; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(l)(2) 
(1980) (elaborating on the circumstances in which a demand instrument will be 
reclassified as equity); id. § 1.385-7(c)(1) (explaining the circumstances in which 
a certain other obligation will be reclassified as equity). 
 142. See id. § 1.385-6(e)(1) (imposing what is considered a reasonable annual 
rate of interest).  
 143. Section 6621 of the I.R.C. provides rules for determining an overpayment 
and underpayment rate of interest. For more information on these rules, see 
generally I.R.C. § 6621 (2012).  
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rate between any of the rates described and “at the end of the 
taxable year  in which the determination is made, the 
debt-to-equity ratio is not greater than 1:1.”144  
C. Treatment of Instruments Generally 
Under the regulations, the Treasury Department determined 
the status of an instrument as either debt or equity at the time of 
issuance.145 All instruments treated as debt are treated as 
indebtedness for all purposes of the Code unless specifically 
recharacterized as equity.146 Debt obligations reclassified as equity 
became preferred stock.147 The only instruments that could be 
recharacterized as preferred stock are hybrid instruments148 and 
straight debt instruments in certain enumerated circumstances.149 
A purported debt instrument reclassified as preferred stock can 
never be restored to the status of debt.150 
D. Treatment of Straight Debt Instruments 
The regulations defined straight debt instruments as any 
instrument that is not a hybrid instrument.151 A corporation that 
issued a straight debt instrument would treat it as indebtedness if 
issued proportionately to the issuing corporation’s shareholders.152 
There were five exceptions that reclassified a straight debt 
instrument as preferred stock. First, if a corporation had excessive 
debt.153 Second, if an instrument was not issued for money and did 
                                                                                                     
 144. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)(i) (1980).  
 145. Id. § 1.385-4(b)(1).  
 146. Id. § 1.385-4(c)(1).  
 147. Id.  
 148. See id. § 1.385-5(a) (issuing rules for the treatment of hybrid 
instruments). 
 149. See id. § 1.385-6 (d), (f), (j), (k), (l) (describing the circumstances in which 
a straight debt instrument will be reclassified as preferred stock).  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. § 1.385-3(f). 
 152. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1). 
 153. Id.; see also id. § 1.385-6(f)(1) (prescribing the general rules on how to 
determine whether a corporation has excessive debt). 
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not meet all the requirements of § 1.385-6(d).154 Third, if an 
instrument was payable on demand but the stated annual rate of 
interest was not reasonable.155 Fourth, if a corporation failed to pay 
interest156 or failed to pay the principal when due.157 Lastly, if 
there was a substantial change in the terms of the instrument.158  
E. Treatment of Hybrid Instruments 
Hybrid instruments were defined as “an instrument that is 
convertible into stock or one (such as an income bond or a 
participating bond) that provides for any contingent payment to 
the holder (other than a call premium).”159 The regulations initially 
characterized a hybrid instrument as equity if its fair market 
value, excluding equity features, was less than fifty percent of its 
actual fair market value, including equity features.160 If the issuer 
and holder reasonably believed on the day of issue that the fair 
market value of the instrument excluding its equity features was 
below fifty percent of the actual fair market value including its 
equity features, then the percentage becomes forty-five percent.161 
Forty-five percent would be substituted for fifty percent only by a 
showing of clear and convincing evidence.162 The regulations 
                                                                                                     
 154. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1); see also id. § 1.385-6(d)(1), (3) (laying out when an 
instrument not issued for money will be treated as stock).  
 155. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1); see also id. § 1.385-6(l)(1), (2) (highlighting the 
circumstances in which an instrument will initially be classified as stock and 
when it will later be reclassified as stock).  
 156. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1); see also id. § 1.385-6(k)(1) (imposing rules for when 
the nonpayment of interest will result in a classification of an instrument as 
stock). 
 157. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1); see also id. § 1.385-6(l)(3) (detailing when an 
instrument is considered payable on demand).   
 158. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1). A substantial change in the terms of the instrument 
are any changes that materially affect “the fair market value of the instrument.” 
Id. § 1.385-6(j)(2). 
 159. Id. § 1.385-3(e).  
 160. Id. § 1.385-5(a). 
 161. Id. § 1.385-5(c).  
 162. Id.  
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defined equity features as the right to contingent payments 
(excluding the call premium)163 and convertibility to equity.164  
F. The Substantial Proportionality Rules 
The regulations provided seven tests to characterize 
instruments as preferred stock when an instrument was issued in 
substantial proportion to the holdings of common stock.165 
Although the regulations do not define the term “substantial 
proportionality,” the Treasury Department determined 
substantial proportionality “from all relevant facts and 
circumstances, including family or other relationships.”166 Section 
318 of the I.R.C. defined family or other relationships as 
relationships stemming from marriage, birth of a child (including 
adopted children) or grandchild, parents, partnerships, estates, 
trusts, and corporations.167 The proportionality rules do not apply 
to a corporation’s stock and instruments that were widely held, 
readily marketable, and separately traded,168 or to instruments 
held by an independent creditor.169 Further, two or more classes of 
instruments may be considered together depending on the facts 
and circumstances.170 
1. Tests One & Two:  Hybrid Instruments & Instruments Not 
Issued for Money 
The first test is simple: if a corporation issued a hybrid 
instrument in substantial proportion to stock, then the regulations 
                                                                                                     
 163. The regulations define contingent payment as “any payment other than 
a fixed payment of principal or interest.” Id. § 1.385-5(d)(1). 
 164. Id. § 1.385-5(b). 
 165. See generally id. § 1.385-6. 
 166. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(2). 
 167. I.R.C. § 318(a) (2012).  
 168. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(i) (1980). 
 169. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(ii). An independent creditor is considered independent 
depending on “all relevant facts and circumstances.” Id. § 1.385-6(b)(1). 
 170. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(4). For examples of the facts and circumstances that 
would lead two instruments to be treated as one, see id. § 1.385-6(a)(4)(i), (ii).   
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treated the instrument as preferred stock.171 The second test is 
more complex: if a corporation issues an instrument in exchange 
for property other than cash, then the regulations treated the 
instrument as preferred stock if two conditions were met.172 First, 
the stated annual rate of interest was not reasonable.173 Second, 
the issuance did not give rise to original issue discount under 
§ 1232(a)(3) or amortizable bond premium under § 1.61-12(c)(2).174 
There was an exception, however, for a corporation that issued an 
instrument for an amount of consideration equal to or greater than 
the principal amount175 of indebtedness of the issuing 
corporation.176 Two requirements had to be met for the exception 
to apply. First, an independent creditor exercising ordinary 
diligence would agree to the exchange.177 Second, “[t]he issuing 
corporation would, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, have 
agreed to make the exchange with an independent creditor holding 
the outstanding indebtedness.”178  
2. Test Three: Excessive Debt 
The regulations treated an instrument as preferred stock, if a 
corporation with excessive debt issued an instrument in 
substantial proportion to stock.179 The regulations find a 
                                                                                                     
 171. See id. § 1.385-6(c)(1) (“If this section applies to a hybrid instrument 
immediately after it is issued, then the instrument is treated as stock.”); id. 
§ 1.385-4(c)(1)(i) (explaining that an instrument recharacterized as stock is 
treated as preferred stock).   
 172. See id. § 1.385-6(d)(1) (implementing rules pertaining to when an 
instrument is issued in exchange for property); id. § 1.385-4(c)(1)(i) (“If an 
instrument is treated as stock under section 385, then the instrument is treated 
as preferred stock . . . .”).  
 173. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(1)(ii). 
 174. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(1)(iii).  
 175. The regulations explain that a principal amount of indebtedness includes 
“interest accrued but unpaid up until the date of the exchange, but only to the 
extent that such interest is paid with principal in the exchange.” Id. 
§ 1.385-6(d)(3)(ii).  
 176. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(3)(i).  
 177. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(3)(i)(A).  
 178. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(3)(i)(B). 
 179. See id. § 1.385-6(f)(1) (laying forth how an instrument issued to a 
corporation with excessive debt will be initially classified); id. § 1.385-4(c)(1)(i) 
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corporation’s debt excessive if a bank, insurance company, or 
similar lending institution would find the terms of the instrument 
and the corporation’s financial structure unsatisfactory.180 A safe 
harbor provision in the regulations holds that a corporation’s debt 
is not excessive if two conditions are met regarding (1) the outside 
ratio requirement and (2) the inside ratio requirement.181 First, 
the corporation’s outside ratio had to be less than or equal to 
10:1.182 A corporation’s outside ratio is determined by the debt-to-
equity ratio rules.183 Second, the corporation’s inside ratio had to 
be less than or equal to 3:1.184 A corporation’s inside ratio was 
determined in the same manner as a corporation’s outside ratio,185 
but excluded liabilities to independent creditors.186  
3. Test Four: Change in Terms of Outstanding Instruments 
The regulations defined a substantial change in the terms of 
an instrument as one that materially affected the fair market 
value of the instrument.187 In general, if an instrument was 
substantially proportional to the stock of the issuer on the day of 
agreement188 and had a substantial change in the terms of the 
instrument, the regulations treated the instrument as newly 
issued in exchange for property on the day of agreement.189 The 
amended terms are then tested under the substantial 
                                                                                                     
(explicating the effects of characterizing an instrument as stock).  
 180. Id. § 1.385-6(f)(2)(i), (ii). “For this purpose, the corporation’s size, 
industry, geographic location, and financial condition must be taken into 
account.” Id. § 1.385-6(f)(2)(ii).  
 181. Id. § 1.385-6(f)(3).  
 182. Id. § 1.385-6(f)(3)(i). 
 183. See supra notes 131–133 (summarizing the debt-to-equity ratio rules).  
 184. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(3)(ii) (1980). 
 185. See supra notes 131–133 (summarizing the debt-to-equity ratio rules). 
 186. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(4). The regulations provide that in determining 
stockholder’s equity, as part of the calculation to determine the inside ratio, a 
corporation does not exclude liabilities. See id. § 1.385-6(f)(4).  
 187. Id. § 1.385-6(j)(2).  
 188. The regulations define “day of agreement” as “the day the issuer and the 
holder enter into a binding contract to change the terms of an instrument.” Id. 
§ 1.385-6(j)(3). 
 189. Id. § 1.385-6(j)(1)(iii).  
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proportionality rules to determine whether the instrument should 
be treated as equity or debt.190 
4. Test Five: Nonpayment of Interest 
The nonpayment of interest would convert a debt instrument 
into preferred stock if the owner of the instrument failed to 
exercise the ordinary diligence of an independent creditor and 
failed to receive payment of all or part of the interest due and 
payable during a taxable year.191 The regulations determined the 
nonpayment of interest on the last day of the taxable year.192 
Further, if the regulations converted a corporation’s purported 
debt instrument into preferred stock, “then the instrument [was] 
treated as stock beginning on the later of the first day of the 
taxable year during which the failure to pay occur[ed] or the first 
day on which this section applied to the instrument.”193 
5. Tests Six & Seven: Demand Instruments & Nonpayment of 
Principal 
The regulations provided a two-part rule for the initial 
classification of an instrument payable on demand. If  a demand 
instrument’s stated annual rate of interest was not reasonable194 
and the demand instrument was issued in substantial proportion 
to the company’s common stock,195 then it became preferred 
stock.196 The regulations also provided rules for an instrument that 
became payable on demand during the taxable year that are 
similar to the rule that pertained to initial classification.197 The 
                                                                                                     
 190. See id. § 1.385-6 (outlining the seven tests under the substantial 
proportionality rules).  
 191. Id. § 1.385-6(k)(1)(i), (ii). 
 192. Id. § 1.385-6(k)(1)(ii). 
 193. Id. § 1.385-6(k)(1)(iii). 
 194. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(iii). 
 195. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(ii). 
 196. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(iii); see also id. § 1.385-4(c)(1)(i) (revealing that if an 
instrument is classified as stock then it is treated as preferred stock).  
 197. See id. § 1.385-6(l)(2) (setting forth the reclassification rules for 
instruments payable on demand).  
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only difference is that if it is reclassified, the regulations treated 
the reclassified instrument as issued at the start (or a portion) of 
that taxable year.198 If an issuing corporation failed to make a 
scheduled payment of principal within ninety days after the 
payment was due and if the holder of the instrument failed to 
exercise the ordinary diligence of an independent creditor, then the 
instrument would be considered to be payable on demand.199 The 
regulations determined an instrument subject to this rule to be 
“payable on demand beginning on the day after the day the 
principal was due.”200  
G. Treatment of Unwritten Obligations 
In general, the regulations treated unwritten obligations, 
obligations not evidenced by a written instrument within six 
months after the day the loan is made,201 differently than 
instruments evidenced by a writing. The rules that pertained to 
the treatment of unwritten obligations did not apply to 
independent creditors and excluded loans repaid within six 
months, but only if the outstanding balance, reduced by the 
outstanding balance of prior qualifying loans, did not exceed 
$25,000.202 If not excluded, the regulations treated an unwritten 
obligation as indebtedness.203 Further, if a corporation issued an 
unwritten obligation and had excessive debt,204 the regulations 
treated it as a contribution to capital.205 Moreover, if the debtor 
corporation failed to make a payment of interest on the loan at a 
reasonable rate of interest,206 the regulations reclassified the loan 
                                                                                                     
 198. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(2)(iii).  
 199. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(3)(i), (ii).  
 200. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(3)(ii). 
 201. Id. § 1.385-7(a)(1)(ii).  
 202. Id. § 1.385-7(a)(2)(i).  
 203. See id. § 1.385-7(a)(2)(ii) (“[A] loan to which this section applies is treated 
as indebtedness.”).  
 204. For a definition of excessive debt, see supra note 180 and accompanying 
text.  
 205. Id. § 1.385-7(b)(2). 
 206. For a definition of reasonable rate of interest, see supra notes 142–144 
and accompanying text.  
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as a contribution to capital.207 Any unwritten obligation that was 
treated as a contribution to capital under these rules would be 
treated as a distribution of property under I.R.C. § 301.208 Under 
I.R.C. § 301, the Treasury Department taxed any unwritten 
obligation on “that portion of the distribution that [was] not a 
dividend, to the extent that it exceed[ed] the adjusted basis of the 
stock.”209 As such, § 301 treated it “as a gain from the sale or 
exchange of property.”210  
H. Treatment of Guaranteed Loans 
Relevant legal principles still applied to a corporation that 
incurred a loan guaranteed by a shareholder.211 Further, if a court 
treated such a loan as made by the shareholder under relevant 
legal principles, then the common law treated the shareholder as 
having made a contribution to capital of the corporation.212 
I. Treatment of Preferred Stock 
The regulations treated preferred stock in one of two ways: 
(1) as equity if there were no fixed principal or interest payments; 
213 or (2) as debt if there were.214 Preferred stock classified as 
indebtedness was subject to the rules under the treatment of 
instruments generally, unless classified as equity. Therefore, 
under the regulations, preferred stock was subject to the hybrid 
instruments rules or the proportionality rules.215  
                                                                                                     
 207. Id. § 1.385-7(c)(1).  
 208. Id. § 1.385-7(d) (describing the effect of a corporation’s failure to pay 
reasonable interest on a loan).  
 209. I.R.C. § 301 (c)(3)(A) (2012). 
 210. Id.  
 211. See id. § 1.385-9(a) (laying out the various rules for guaranteed loans).  
 212. See id. § 1.385-9(a)(2) (conveying that guaranteed loans will be 
determined under relevant legal principles “applied without reference to the 
regulations under section 385”).  
 213. Id. § 1.385-10(a). 
 214. Id.  
 215. See id. (explicating the rules under which preferred stock can be 
classified as indebtedness).  
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The rules for the treatment of preferred stock also set forth a 
rule of convenience that treated preferred stock as equity, but only 
if six conditions were met.216 First, the preferred stock was 
denominated preferred stock and treated as preferred stock under 
non-tax law.217 Second, the surplus of the preferred stock’s 
redemption price over its issue price was a reasonable redemption 
premium under § 1.305-5.218 Third, the preferred stock’s current 
dividends were contingent.219 Fourth, rights to receive dividend 
and redemption payments of preferred stock were not enforced 
under non-tax law because the issuing corporation was insolvent, 
would be rendered insolvent by making such payments, or because 
making those payments would impair the issuing corporation’s 
capital.220 Fifth, a default on dividend or redemption payment of 
preferred stock would not accelerate redemption payments at the 
election of the holder.221 Sixth, there was at least a ten-year 
limitation during which the holder was not allowed to compel 
redemption.222 This brief summary of the 1980 regulations 
illustrates why they were dropped after voluminous criticism: they 
were unduly complex and attempted to address every potential 
permutation, they were too rigid in places, and in other cases they 
failed to address real-world complexities. 
VI. The 2016 Approach 
A. Background 
On April 8, 2016, the Treasury Department issued proposed 
regulations under § 385.223 This time, the Treasury Department 
sought to provide rules to determine the true nature of an interest 
                                                                                                     
 216. See id. § 1.385-10(b) (providing the rule of convenience).  
 217. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(1). 
 218. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(2) 
 219. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(3). 
 220. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(4). 
 221. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(5). 
 222. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(6). 
 223. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-4, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912 
(Apr. 8, 2016). 
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in a corporation.224 On October 21, 2016, the Treasury Department 
finalized the proposed regulations in an unusually rapid pace of 
adoption.225 The regulations apply to expanded group instruments 
(EGI) and instruments issued by members of an expanded group 
that are domestic corporations.226 An EGI is generally defined as 
an instrument denominated as debt (regardless of its ultimate 
characterization by the I.R.S.) that one member of an “expanded 
group” issued to another member.227 An expanded group “generally 
includes all corporations connected to a common parent that owns, 
directly or indirectly, 80% of the vote or value of each such 
corporation.”228 Excluded from these regulations are 
S-corporations, non-controlled regulated investment companies, 
real estate investment trusts, partnerships and certain specified 
financial entities, financial groups, insurance companies,229 and 
qualified short term debt instruments.230 Further, taxpayers 
subject to these regulations are entitled to exclude the first $50 
million of debt that is otherwise recharacterized as equity.231  
                                                                                                     
 224. See id. (noting that the absence of regulations under § 385 resulted in 
courts applying inconsistent sets of factors).  
 225. Compare id. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-4 (proposing regulations under § 385 on 
April 8, 2016), with Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T (2016) (finalizing regulations 
under § 385 on October 21, 2016).  
 226. See id. § 1.385-2(a)(3) (stipulating which instruments are subject to the 
documentation requirements).  
 227. Id. § 1.385-2(d)(3).  
 228. DELOITTE, FINAL/TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ADDRESS TREATMENT OF 
CERTAIN INTERESTS IN CORPORATIONS AS STOCK OR INDEBTEDNESS 2 (2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-alert-
new-section-385-regulations.pdf; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(c)(4)(i) (2016) 
(giving a definition of expanded group). 
 229. See id. § 1.385-3(c) (excluding certain types of companies from the scope 
of these rules).  
 230. The regulations contain a full section on rules pertaining to qualified 
short-term debt obligations, but because those rules are beyond the scope of this 
Note, they are not discussed in depth. For more information on qualified 
short-term debt instruments, see id. § 1.385-3T (exempting qualified short-term 
debt instruments).  
 231. See id. § 1.385-3(c)(4) (excluding the first $50 million of debt a 
corporation issues).  
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B. Documentation Rules 
1. Scope 
The rules set forth an explicit set of documentation 
requirements that must be followed to avoid the characterization 
of certain instruments as debt rather than equity.232 The purpose 
of the documentation requirements is twofold. First, it provides the 
Treasury Department with the ability to make a proper 
determination as to whether an instrument is debt or equity by 
providing guidance on the necessary documentation and 
information a corporation must prepare, maintain, and provide to 
the I.R.S.233 Second, it establishes “operating rules, presumptions, 
and factors to be taken into account” in making a proper 
determination under the regulations.234 
The regulations point out that compliance alone with this 
section will not deem an instrument debt, but failure to maintain 
this documentation may disqualify an instrument from debt 
status.235 The documentation rules require a corporation to 
maintain “complete copies of all instruments, agreements, 
subordination agreements, and other documents evidencing the 
material rights and obligations of the issuer and holder relating to 
the EGI.”236 A corporation must prepare these records by the time 
that the issuer’s federal income tax return is filed.237 
The application of the documentation requirements to an 
expanded group instrument is limited based on certain 
qualifications. First, this Section only covers an expanded group 
instrument if it is issued to a covered member.238 Second, this 
Section applies to an expanded group instrument only if it meets 
any of three threshold requirements: (1) the stock by any member 
                                                                                                     
 232. See id. § 1.385-2(a)(1) (providing documentation requirements).   
 233. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(2). 
 234. Id.  
 235. See id. (revealing that compliance with the documentation rules only 
serves to “satisfy the minimum documentation for the determination to be made”).  
 236. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(1)(i). 
 237. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(4)(i).  
 238. A covered member is regarded as a “member of an expanded group that 
is . . . a domestic corporation” or a disregarded entity as defined in § 1.385-1(c)(3). 
Id. § 1.385-1(c)(2). 
2314 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2281 (2017) 
of the expanded group is traded on an established financial 
market, (2) total assets of the issuing corporation exceed $100 
million, or (3) annual total revenue of the issuing corporation 
exceeds $50 million.239  
2. The Per Se Rule and Rebuttable Presumption 
Under the Documentation Rules, there is a per se rule that 
characterizes an expanded group instrument as equity if a 
corporation fails to prepare, maintain, and provide the appropriate 
documents and does not qualify for an exception.240 A rebuttable 
presumption from per se treatment exists if the corporation can 
clearly show under common law factors that the expanded group 
instrument is debt.241 The rebuttable presumption only applies 
where a corporation has a high percentage of expanded group 
instruments (other than the one at issue) that comply with the 
documentation requirements.242 For an expanded group to make 
this showing, one of two requirements must be met. 
First, the average total adjusted issue price of all expanded 
group instruments at the close of each quarter that are 
undocumented and outstanding must be less than ten percent of 
the average amount of the total adjusted issue price of all expanded 
group instruments outstanding at the end of the taxable year.243  
Second, in the alternative, no expanded group instrument that is 
undocumented is determined to have an issue price in excess of 
either $100 million or in the alternative $25 million; a corporation 
can meet the requirement under either determination.244 A 
corporation meets the $100 million test if the number of 
undocumented and outstanding expanded group instruments 
averaged at the close of each quarter is  less than five percent of 
all averaged expanded group instruments that are outstanding at 
                                                                                                     
 239. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(3)(ii).  
 240. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(1).  
 241. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(A). 
 242. See id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B) (requiring corporations to meet this threshold 
requirement in order to claim that a rebuttable presumption exists).  
 243. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(1).  
 244. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(2). 
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the end of the taxable year.245 A corporation meets the  $25 million 
test if  the number of undocumented and outstanding expanded 
group instruments averaged at the close of each quarter is less 
than ten percent of all averaged expanded group instruments that 
are outstanding at the end of the taxable year.246 Moreover, under 
the Anti-Stuffing Rule, manipulation of adjusted issue prices of 
expanded group instruments is discounted in making this 
determination.247 When making this determination, the Treasury 
Department may find reasonable cause for a corporation’s failure 
to adhere to the documentation requirements.248 An expanded 
group member who fails to prepare the required documents and 
seeks redress must prepare those documents within a reasonable 
time and maintain those documents.249 
3. Indebtedness Factors 
Within an expanded group instrument’s documentation, the 
regulations set forth certain criteria a corporation must meet to 
satisfy the documentation requirements. First, there must be a 
written unconditional and legal obligation by the issuer to pay a 
determinable sum on demand or on a specific date.250 Second, there 
must be written documentation that establishes the creditor’s 
right to enforce the obligation.251 Third, there must be written 
documentation that there is a reasonable expectation that, on the 
date of issuance, the issuer’s financial position creates a 
reasonable expectation that the issuer intends to repay the debt.252 
Fourth, subsequent to the issuance of the note, the parties must 
behave in a manner consistent with a debtor-creditor 
relationship.253 It should be noted that the reasonable expectation 
requirement and consistent behavior requirements are more in the 
                                                                                                     
 245. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(i).  
 246. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(ii). 
 247. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(4).  
 248. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(C)(ii)(A).  
 249. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(C)(ii)(B).  
 250. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(i). 
 251. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(ii). 
 252. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii). 
 253. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv). 
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nature of substantive than procedural requirements; merely 
documenting a loan may not rise to the level of a genuine belief in 
repayment ability or genuine conduct as a debtor or a creditor.254  
C. Recharacterization Rule 
1. Scope 
The Recharacterization Rules are intended to address 
situations in which a covered debt instrument is issued to a related 
person that does not result in a new investment in the operations 
of the issuing corporation.255 Under the Recharacterization Rules, 
the Treasury Department treats a debt instrument as equity if it 
is described by the General Rule, does not fall under one of the 
exceptions of the Funding Rule, and is not subject to the 
Anti-Abuse Rule.256 As a result, the Recharacterization Rule 
operates “to recast a debt instrument into [equity] if: (i) a member 
of the expanded group issues the instrument in a tainted 
transaction to another member of the expanded group; or (ii) the 
instrument is deemed to fund the tainted transaction.”257 Once a 
covered debt is treated as equity, the regulations specify its 
continued treatment as equity for all federal tax purposes.258  
                                                                                                     
 254. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii) (identifying what it means to have a reasonable 
expectation of repayment); id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv) (clarifying that to meet the 
creditor-debtor relationship requirement there must be a showing of payments of 
principal and interest along with enforcement and non-enforcement of creditor’s 
rights).  
 255. Id. § 1.385-3(a). 
 256. Id.  
 257. ERNST & YOUNG LLP, FINAL AND TEMPORARY US SECTION 385 
REGULATIONS SIGNIFICANTLY NARROW SCOPE OF EARLIER PROPOSED REGULATIONS 




lier%20proposed%20regs%20GL.pdf [hereinafter FINAL AND TEMPORARY 
REGULATIONS]. 
 258. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1) (2016). 
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2. General Rule 
The General Rule specifies three types of transactions that the 
Treasury Department will characterize as equity when a 
corporation issues a covered debt instrument to a member of its 
expanded group. The first is a distribution.259 The second is an 
exchange for expanded group stock that is not an exempt 
exchange.260 The third is an exchange for property in an asset 
reorganization, but only if a shareholder in the transferor 
corporation that is also a member of the issuer’s expanded group 
receives “immediately before the reorganization the covered debt 
instrument with respect to its stock in the transferor 
corporation.”261  
3. Funding Rule 
The Funding Rule was put in place “to prevent taxpayers from 
achieving in multiple steps what the General Rule prevents 
taxpayers from achieving in one step.”262 Under the Funding Rule, 
a funded member263 who issues a debt instrument to an expanded 
group member may have that debt instrument treated as equity if 
the principal purpose of funding that transaction is similar to the 
transactions described in the General Rule.264 A per se rule under 
the Funding Rule deems any debt instrument (other than certain 
instruments issued both in the ordinary course of business and in 
connection with the purchase of property or services in non-capital 
transactions) as equity if a corporation issued the instrument 
during the period beginning thirty-six months before and ending 
                                                                                                     
 259. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(i). 
 260. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(ii). 
 261. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(iii).  
 262. FINAL AND TEMPORARY REGULATIONS, supra note 257, at 6. 
 263. A “funded member” is defined as a covered member that makes: (1) a 
distribution with respect to stock, (2) in exchange for “expanded group” stock 
(with limited exceptions for exempt exchanges), or (3) in exchange for property in 
an internal restructuring that is treated as an asset reorganization for U.S. 
federal income tax purposes (including an “A,” “C,” “D,” “F,” or “G” 
reorganization). Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(i) (2016).  
 264. See id. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(i)(A), (B), (C) (laying forth the identical 
transactions).  
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thirty-six months after the date of a distribution or acquisition 
described in the General Rule.265  
4. Anti-Abuse Rule 
The Anti-Abuse Rule prevents a corporation from treating an 
instrument as debt if the instrument was issued to avoid the 
Anti-Abuse Rule or the rules for qualified short-term debt 
instruments.266 The Anti-Abuse Rule exempts an acquisition of 
expanded group stock from the General Rule or Funding Rule if 
one condition is met:  
[T]he member of the expanded group from which the expanded 
group stock is acquired, and the acquirer does not relinquish 
control of the seller pursuant to a plan that existed on the date 
of the acquisition, other than in a transaction in which the seller 
ceases to be a member of the expanded group of which the 
acquirer is a member.267 
Control of a corporation is defined as owning, directly or 
indirectly, more than fifty percent of the voting power of all classes 
of stock and more than fifty percent of the total value of the stock 
of the corporation.268 Under the exception, there is a presumption 
that the acquirer of the expanded group stock has a plan to 
relinquish control to the seller within a thirty-six month period 
after the acquisition date.269 This presumption may be rebutted 
only by clearly showing that the loss of control was neither 
contemplated on the date of acquisition, nor meant to avoid the 
Recharacterization Rules.270 
                                                                                                     
 265. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(iii)(A).  
 266. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(4). For a list of non-exhaustive examples to transactions 
that the Anti-Abuse Rule may apply, see id. § 1.385-3(b)(4)(i), (ii). 
 267. Id. § 1.385-3(c)(2)(i)(A). 
 268. Id. § 1.385-3(c)(2)(i)(B). 
 269. Id. § 1.385-3(c)(2)(i)(C). 
 270. Id. 
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VII. Analyzing the Common Law Approach, the 1980 Regulations, 
and the 2016 Regulations 
To analyze the approaches followed by the common law and 
the 1980 and 2016 regulations, it is instructive to look at a set of 
examples of the types of transactions multinational corporations 
might enter into today. The first example is a straightforward loan 
from a wholly owned subsidiary to a parent company.271 The second 
example is a more complex convertible loan from a large 
shareholder to a corporation.272 The third is a loan extended in 
exchange for property by a troubled company to a large 
shareholder (Company A).273 In all cases, we assume that the loan 
is documented by a written contract. For purposes of the 2016 
regulations, we assume that the loans in question constitute an 
EGI,274 the total assets of the corporation exceed $100 million,275 
the corporation satisfies the documentation rules with respect to 
the loan,276 and each corporation already excluded the first $50 
million of debt that is otherwise covered.277  
A. Example 1: Traditional Loan 
Company A borrows $250 million from its wholly owned 
subsidiary Company B.  Company A is a multinational corporation 
with a book value of $1 billion and a public market capitalization 
of $5 billion. The loan is documented in a note that sets forth the 
                                                                                                     
 271. See infra Part VII.A (analyzing a traditional loan under the common law, 
1980 regulations, and 2016 regulations). 
 272. See infra Part VII.B (examining the determination of a convertible loan 
as either debt or equity under the common law, 1980 regulations, and 2016 
regulations). 
 273. See infra Part VII.C (evaluating whether a troubled company loan should 
be characterized as debt or equity under the common law, 1980 regulations, and 
2016 regulations).  
 274. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (defining and describing 
what constitutes an EGI). 
 275. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(a)(ii) (2016) (requiring a corporation to meet 
one of three threshold requirements to be subjected to the documentation rules).  
 276. See id. § 1.385-2(b)(1) (treating a corporation’s instrument as equity if it 
fails to properly document and maintain certain documents).  
 277. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (describing the $50 million 
exclusion).  
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terms (Note 1).  Note 1 is due in five years and pays interest at the 
rate of seven percent per annum on a semiannual basis in arrears.  
The debt is ranked pari passu with the company’s bank debt and 
senior to its subordinated debt and common stock. In the event of 
non-payment, there is a thirty-day grace period after which the 
loan is declared in default. Company B has traditional creditor’s 
remedies, including the right to sue Company A for payment.  
1. Common Law Analysis 
Under the common law analysis, which looks at the four 
corners of the Note, the intent of the parties to establish a debt 
instrument is clear.278 Company B is vested with traditional 
creditors rights: interest payments are mandatory,279 Company B 
has the right to demand payment and sue for non-payment,280 the 
loan has a set maturity date,281 the loan ranks senior to the 
company’s equity and subordinated debt,282 and the company’s 
financial condition at the time the loan was extended makes it 
reasonable to expect repayment at maturity.283 
2. 1980 Regulations 
Under the 1980 regulations, the Note meets the test of a debt 
instrument; it does not possess any of the attributes of a hybrid 
instrument that gives rise to analysis creating potential 
characterization as preferred stock.284 Issues regarding the fair 
                                                                                                     
 278. See supra notes 75–102 and accompanying text (identifying and 
explaining the common law factors that bear on an objective determination of an 
intent to create a debtor-creditor relationship).  
 279. See supra notes 71, 92–93 and accompanying text (discussing the weight 
of interest payments in making a determination of debt or equity treatment).  
 280. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 420 (explaining that the right to force 
payment upon default supports a finding of equity treatment).  
 281. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (noting the value of having 
a fixed maturity date).  
 282. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (establishing the importance 
of subordination). 
 283. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (detailing the significance 
of a corporation’s failure to enforce a default).  
 284. See supra notes 151–158 and accompanying text (summarizing the 
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market value of the instrument,285 the debt equity ratio,286 or the 
reasonable rate of interest are all satisfied.287 
3. 2016 Regulations 
Under the new 2016 regulations, which corporations now must 
satisfy, the Note is considered debt.  To determine whether the 
Note is equity under the Recharacterization Rules issued in 2016, 
the Note must fall within either the General Rule or the Funding 
Rule and avoid capture by the Anti-Abuse rule.288 Under the 
General Rule, the regulations characterize a debt instrument as 
equity if it was issued by a corporation to a member of the 
corporation’s “expanded group”289 (a) in a distribution with respect 
to stock; (b) in exchange for “expanded group” stock (with limited 
exceptions for exempt exchanges); or (c) in exchange for property 
in an internal restructuring that is treated as an asset 
reorganization for U.S. federal income tax purposes (including an 
“A”, “C”, “D”, “F”, or “G” reorganization.).290 In this case, Company 
A and B are part of an “expanded group” but the loan does not fall 
under any of the transactions described in the General Rule; 
therefore, the Note is not recharacterized as equity. Further, under 
the Funding Rule, the regulations reclassify a debt instrument as 
equity to the extent a corporation issued it to a member of the 
funded member’s “expanded group” in exchange for property.291 
Again, because Company A and B are members of an “expanded 
                                                                                                     
treatment of straight debt instruments).  
 285. See supra notes 118–127 and accompanying text (revealing how a 
determination of the fair market value of an instrument is necessary). 
 286. See supra notes 128–134 and accompanying text (describing how a 
determination of a corporation’s debt-to-equity ratio is needed for a proper 
evaluation). 
 287. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (clarifying the 
importance of a proper determination of a reasonable rate of interest). 
 288. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (2016) (presenting how the 
Recharacterization Rules operate). 
 289. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (defining “expanded 
group”).  
 290. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2) (2016) (providing the various transactions 
that fall under the general rule). 
 291. See supra notes 262–265 and accompanying text (examining the Funding 
Rule). 
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group” but  the loan does fall under any of the transactions 
described in the Funding Rule, recharacterization of the 
instrument does not occur.  
B. Example 2: Convertible Loan 
Company A borrows $250 million from its largest shareholder, 
XYZ Hedge Fund, which owns ten percent of its common stock and 
appointed two of the company’s seven directors.  The terms of the 
loan (Note 2) are as follows: (1) the loan is convertible into ten 
percent of the company’s common stock if the stock reaches a price 
of $25 per share (it is trading at $10 per share at the time the loan 
is made), (2) it pays interest at three percent per year 
semiannually in arrears, (3) interest can be paid in cash or by the 
issuance of additional bonds at the option of the company, (4) it 
matures in five years, and (5) the lender is given traditional 
remedies upon default. To illustrate the ability to pay interest via 
issuance of additional bonds, the company can choose to make the 
semiannual interest payment of $3.75 million (3% x $250,000,000 
x 6 months) by issuing an additional $3.75 million face amount of 
bonds with the same terms as the Note rather than paying cash. 
The loan ranks senior to the company’s equity and pari passu with 
its subordinated debt, but is subordinated to its senior debt (this is 
traditional for convertible debt instruments). There is a thirty-day 
grace period for interest payments, after which XYZ Hedge Fund 
can assert its rights as a creditor. Company A is solvent and 
otherwise financially sound at the time the loan is made. 
1. Common Law Analysis 
While a convertible note is a hybrid instrument possessing the 
attributes of both equity and debt,292 Note 2 should be treated as a 
debt instrument prior to the time of conversion (if ever) into stock. 
                                                                                                     
 292. See David Newton, Understanding Convertible Loans, ENTREPRENEUR 
(Oct. 28, 2002), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/56512 (last visited Feb. 28, 
2017) (“Typically, the conversion feature [of a convertible loan] gives the lender 
an option to convert all or a portion of the outstanding principal of the loan into 
some form of an equity position in the borrower’s company.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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Traditional creditors’ rights vest with Company B: interest 
payments are mandatory,293 Company B has the right to demand 
payment and sue for non-payment,294 the loan has a set maturity 
date,295 the loan ranks senior to the company’s equity and pari 
passu with its subordinated debt,296 and the company’s financial 
condition at the time the loan was extended makes it reasonable to 
expect repayment at maturity.297 
2. 1980 Regulations 
The 1980 regulations raise unnecessary confusion regarding 
the treatment of this Note.  Until the Note is converted or 
Company A defaults, this Note appears to meet the definition of a 
“hybrid instrument” under these regulations: “[a]n instrument 
that is convertible into stock or one (such as an income bond or a 
participating bond) that provides for any contingent payment to 
the holder (other than a call premium).”298  A hybrid instrument 
is treated as equity on the day of issuance if the fair market value 
of the instrument excluding its equity features is less than fifty 
percent of the actual fair market value of the instrument including 
its equity features.299 In this case, however, because XYZ Hedge 
Fund is financially sound, it is unlikely that more than fifty 
percent of the value of the Note is attributable to its equity 
component, and therefore, the Note should not be recharacterized 
as equity. Further, Company A did not issue the Note 
proportionately to the common stock, and therefore, it would not 
                                                                                                     
 293. See supra notes 71, 92–93 and accompanying text (observing the various 
weight interest payments have received under the common law).  
 294. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 420 (“The ‘right to force payment of the sum 
as a debt in the event of default’ is a very significant, if not essential factor.” 
(quoting United States v. S. Ga. Ry., 107 F. Supp. 382, 395 (N.D. Ohio (1968))). 
 295. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (establishing the 
significance of having a fixed maturity date).  
 296. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the weight courts 
have given subordination under a common law multi-factored analysis). 
 297. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (specifying the 
consequences of a corporation’s failure to enforce a default).  
 298. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(e) (1980).  
 299. See id. § 1.385-5(a) (setting forth the initial classification rules for hybrid 
instruments).  
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implicate the tests under the regulations that would lead to its 
becoming preferred stock.300 Finally, Company A is not an 
excessively leveraged company issuing an instrument 
proportionately to its common stock, so again, the Note is not 
subject to recharacterization as preferred stock.301 The regulations 
introduce significant and unnecessary complexity into the 
analysis.  
3. 2016 Regulations 
Under the new 2016 regulations, Note 2 is also considered 
debt. Under the General Rule,302 Company A and XYZ Hedge Fund 
are not considered part of an “expanded group,”303 and therefore, 
the regulations do not recharacterize the Note as equity. Further, 
under the Funding Rule,304 Company A and XYZ Hedge Fund also 
are not members of an “expanded group,”305 and therefore, no 
recharacterization of the instrument occurs. Regarding the 
documentation requirements, it appears that there was a 
reasonable expectation of repayment at the time the loan was 
extended and the parties appear to be maintaining an arm’s length 
debtor-creditor relationship in their commercial relationship as 
stockholder/corporation.306 Application of the new regulations 
produces the correct result, i.e., treatment of Note 2 as debt. 
                                                                                                     
 300. See supra Part IV.F (supplying the substantial proportionality rules). 
 301. See supra Section IV.F.2 (elaborating on the excessive debt test under 
the substantial proportionality rules). 
 302. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2) (2016) (setting forth the transactions that 
are subject to the general rule).  
 303. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (providing a definition 
for expanded group). 
 304. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(i) (2016) (indexing the transactions to 
which the Funding Rule applies). 
 305. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (establishing the 
definition for “expanded group”). 
 306. See supra notes 232–239 and accompanying text (outlining the 
documentation requirements necessary to support a finding of debt treatment).  
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C. Example 3: Distressed Company Loan 
Company A is in financial distress. It is running out of cash to 
fund its payroll and is at risk of filing for bankruptcy unless it can 
obtain immediate funding. It borrows $100 million from its largest 
shareholder (Note 3), Vulture Hedge Fund (Vulture), which invests 
in distressed companies. Vulture has accumulated a thirty-five 
percent stake in Company A over the last few months at very low 
stock prices because the market knows that the company is in 
trouble. Vulture drives a very hard bargain. It agrees to lend 
Company A the money only on the following terms:  a one-year loan 
secured by all of Company A’s real estate at a rate of ten percent 
(the Prime Rate is one percent) payable monthly convertible into 
seventy-five percent of Company A’s stock in the event of default; 
interest is payable monthly with a five-day grace period after 
which Vulture can demand immediate payment; Vulture gets 
three of Company A’s seven board seats now and two more board 
seats upon default; and Vulture gets access to monthly financial 
reports from the company. The loan ranks senior to all of 
Company’s A existing debt and equity. Having no alternative, 
Company A agrees to the deal. 
1. Common Law Analysis 
Note 3 highlights the shortcomings of the common law 
approach to the debt/equity issue. Under the common law analysis, 
looking at the four corners of the agreement leads to the conclusion 
that this is a debt instrument. It appears from Note 3 that the 
parties intended to establish a debt instrument. Vulture is 
invested with traditional creditor’s rights: interest payments are 
mandatory,307 Vulture has the right to demand payment and sue 
for non-payment,308 the loan has a set maturity date,309 and the 
                                                                                                     
 307. See supra notes 69–71, 92–93 and accompanying text (pointing out the 
various ways courts have dealt with interest payments).  
 308. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 420 (evaluating the treatment of remedies 
for default). 
 309. See id. at 413 (“The most important of the formal factors is a provision 
for a fixed . . . time when the purported creditor is unconditionally entitled to 
require payment of the principal.”). 
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loan ranks senior to the company’s debt and equity.310 But the 
company is on the verge of insolvency, so regardless of what the 
company intended, it may not be realistic to expect repayment of 
the loan in cash. Instead, a more reasonable expectation may be 
repayment through conversion of the loan to equity, and an award 
of two more board seats and effective control of the company to 
Vulture. Accordingly, the common law approach falls short in this 
distressed loan situation because courts limited their analysis to 
the four corners of a debt contract which omits important facts 
regarding the company’s financial condition, leading them to weigh 
factors in these types of situations without regard to commercial 
realities.311 
2. 1980 Regulations 
Surprisingly, the much-maligned 1980 regulations may work 
best in this type of situation where a hybrid instrument is used to 
bail out a financially troubled company. Application of the 
preliminary three-part test analyzing the fair market value of the 
instrument, the debt-to-equity ratio, and the reasonable rate of 
interest on the loan leads to the conclusion that Note 3 should be 
treated as equity rather than as debt.312 This test highlights the 
reality that Note 3 is likely worth far less than face value at the 
time Vulture extended the loan because much of the proceeds will 
likely be used to pay arrearages on payables and other obligations 
of the company to keep it operating.313 The company’s 
debt-to-equity ratio is also likely to be extremely elevated, 
suggesting that the new funds invested should be treated as equity 
because they are at high risk of not being repaid.314 The 1980 
                                                                                                     
 310. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (elaborating on the significance 
of subordination). 
 311. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 408 (asserting that the courts “arrive at 
opposite results on identical facts” depending on which factors they wish to 
stress). 
 312. See supra Part IV.B and accompanying text (explicating the importance 
of the preliminary rules). 
 313. See supra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying text (exploring the treatment 
of an instrument deemed to have a fair market value). 
 314. See supra Part IV.B.2 and accompanying text (disclosing the effect in 
determining the reasonableness of a company’s debt-to-equity ratio).  
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Regulations would likely treat Note 3 as equity, a sound result in 
view of the likelihood that Vulture will end up with control over 
most of the stock and the company’s board in a relatively short 
period of time. 
3. 2016 Regulations 
Under the new 2016 regulations, the determination whether 
Note 3 should be considered debt or equity likely comes down to an 
application of the documentation requirements, rather than the 
Distributed Debt Rules.315 To determine whether Note 3 is equity 
under the Distributed Debt Rules, it must fall within either the 
General Rule or the Funding Rule.316 Technically, under the 
General Rule,317 Company A and Vulture are not considered part 
of an “expanded group,”318 and therefore, Note 3 would not be 
recharacterized as equity. Further, under the Funding Rule, a debt 
instrument is considered equity to the extent a corporation issued 
the instrument to a member of the funded member’s “expanded 
group”319 in exchange for property in a tax-free internal 
organization because while the Note is secured by Company A’s 
property, no property has changed hands yet.320 But the 
documentation requirements create an additional hurdle that may 
cause Note 3 to be recharacterized as equity, nonetheless. Due to 
Company A’s dire financial condition, the I.R.S. could reasonably 
find that there was not a reasonable expectation of repayment at 
the time the loan was extended.321 The Treasury Department could 
                                                                                                     
 315. Compare supra Part VI.C (describing the Recharacterization Rules), 
with supra Part VI.B (stating the Documentation Rules). 
 316. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (2016) (summarizing how the 
Recharacterization Rules operate).  
 317. See id. § 1.385-3(b)(2) (supplying the transactions to which the General 
Rule applies). 
 318. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (defining “expanded 
group”). 
 319. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (giving a definition for 
expanded group). 
 320. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(i)(C) (2016) (providing that the funding 
rule applies to transactions in which a funded member in an asset reorganization 
acquires property). 
 321. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii) (“There must be written documentation 
containing information establishing that, as of the date of issuance . . . and taking 
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find that certain terms of the loan, such as the board 
representation and provision of monthly financial reports to 
Vulture, are not characteristic of a normal debtor-creditor 
relationship.322 These findings could fail to meet the 
documentation requirements and lead the I.R.S. to find that the 
Note should be treated as equity and not debt.323 In this case that 
may well prove to be the correct result.  
VIII. A Case for the 2016 Regulations 
In the first two examples, the common law approach, the 1980 
regulations, and the 2016 regulations all end up in the same 
position in terms of characterizing an instrument.324 This 
consistency disappears in example three.325 The troubled company 
loan example provides insight into the strengths of the 2016 
regulations.326  
In fashioning a regulatory approach that balances the need to 
provide corporations with clarity and flexibility and the 
government with appropriate tools to fight tax abuse, the 
government adopted the 2016 Regulations.  The 2016 Regulations 
give broad discretion to the I.R.S. to recharacterize debt as equity 
in circumstances where the economic reality does not support a 
showing that repayment of an instrument denominated as debt is 
likely or where the parties do not appear to conduct themselves as 
arm’s length debtors and creditors.327 Moreover, the 2016 
regulations eschew the ambiguity of the common law approach, as 
                                                                                                     
into account all relevant circumstances . . . the issuer’s financial position 
supported a reasonable expectation that the issuer intended to, and would be able 
to, meet its obligations . . . .”).  
 322. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(iv) (informing the taxpayer of the documentation that 
must be provided in order to prove a debtor-creditor relationship existed). 
 323. See id. § 1.385-2(a)(2) (“[C]ompliance with this section does not establish 
that an interest is indebtedness; it serves only to satisfy the minimum 
documentation for the determination to be made under general federal tax 
principles.”).  
 324. See supra Parts VII.A–B (supplying and analyzing examples). 
 325. See supra Part VII.C (comparing the results under the common law, the 
1980 regulations, and the 2016 regulations). 
 326. See supra Part VI.C.3 (analyzing the result under the 2016 regulations).  
 327. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(c)(2) (2016) (establishing the indebtedness 
factors under the documentation requirements).  
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well as the specificity provided in the 1980 regulations, in favor of 
a more intent-based inquiry to prevent parties from engaging in 
tax avoidance transactions through use of complex corporate 
finance techniques.328 Years of aggressive tax practice by 
corporations, intended to elevate form over substance and make it 
as difficult as possible for the I.R.S. to challenge transactions 
designed to turn equity into debt and to confer the tax benefits 
associated with debt on de facto related parties, necessitated such 
an approach.329  
It was long apparent that giving a financial instrument one or 
more of the formal indicia of debt as set forth in the common law 
tests (e.g., a maturity date, an interest rate, a senior ranking, etc.) 
was an exercise in elevating form over substance.330 This is true 
particularly in cases where the borrower’s financial condition 
renders repayment unlikely, or when extension or terms of the 
loan ultimately confer corporate control on the lender 
(intentionally or not).331 Even where a party owns less than eighty 
percent of a borrower or controls less than eighty percent of the 
seats on the board of directors,332 it may as a practical matter own 
a sufficient amount of stock or control enough board seats to 
exercise de facto control of the company even if the relationship 
between the parties falls outside the definition of an expanded 
                                                                                                     
 328. Compare supra Part IV (describing the common law approach), with 
supra Part V (outlining the 1980 regulations), and supra Part VI (exploring the 
2016 regulations). 
 329. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Just Say No: Corporate Taxation and 
Corporate Social Responsibility 19 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 14-010, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2423045 
(stating that there is an increase in aggressive tax behavior among corporations). 
 330. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (revealing that courts 
developed multi-factored test to help determine whether an instrument should be 
treated as debt or equity). 
 331. Sears, for example, took a $425 million loan from Edward Lampert (a 
sixteen percent shareholder in Sears) through his hedge fund. See Gara, supra 
note 4 (mentioning that amount of loans Sears has taken from Lampert). 
Although Lampert does not own eighty percent of Sears’ vote or value, Lampert, 
through his loans,“secured by a junior liens against Sears’ inventory, receivables 
and working capital,” and his sixteen percent ownership stake in Sears, gives him 
de facto control. Id. 
 332. See supra notes 226–229 and accompanying text (laying out that the 
regulations apply to expanded group instruments). 
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group.333 This is particularly true in distressed situations like 
Company A, where Vulture Hedge Fund owns substantial equity, 
controls several board seats, and extends a substantial loan that 
gives it payment priority ahead of common shareholders. In the 
real world, such an arrangement discourages unrelated third 
parties from extending credit or investing equity in the company 
because they are more likely than not to be dealing with Vulture 
Hedge Fund and not Company A.334 The common law approach 
attempted to attack the problem with a narrow focus that led to 
inconsistent results.335 The 1980 regulations mimicked this 
approach and were abandoned because they were too complex and 
promised no better outcome.336 The 2016 regulations broke new 
ground in their breadth, which gives the I.R.S. the explicit 
authority to use the well-recognized tax doctrines of economic 
substance and substance-over-form to look through the formalities 
attached to financial instruments to prevent corporations from 
disguising equity as debt.337 As adopted, the final regulations give 
the I.R.S. the appropriate tools with which to fight abuse, while 
leaving corporations the flexibility necessary to operate their 
businesses.338 Despite this allowance for flexibility, the final 
regulations still provide notice to corporations that any abuses will 
be vulnerable to attack and reversal.339 
At the end of the day, statutory specificity340 and ambiguity341 
need to be in balance in an area as complex as the characterization 
                                                                                                     
 333. See supra Part VII.C.3 (analyzing a distressed company loan). 
 334. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying test (providing background 
information on unrelated party loans). 
 335. See supra Part IV (describing the common law approach). 
 336. See supra Part V (explaining the 1980 regulations). 
 337. See supra Part VI (outlining the 2016 regulations). 
 338. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2 (2016). 
  339. See generally id.  
 340. See Jeffrey Partlow, The Necessity of Complexity in the Tax System, 13 
WYO. L. REV. 305, 316 (2013) (“As taxpayers unearth new loopholes, Congress 
makes changes to the tax laws to avoid and close loopholes, and the result is a 
frequently changing Code with a predisposition toward detailed, complex 
provisions.”). 
 341. See Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of 
Ambiguity: Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9, 12 (1982) (arguing that 
elaborate regulations on whether an instrument is considered debt or equity will 
not reduce the aggregate of residual ambiguity). 
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of financial instruments as debt or equity. Excessive specificity is 
ill-suited to this area of the law, not merely because of the ability 
of corporations and their advisors to weave around technical 
rules,342 but because of the reality that in certain cases, 
particularly those involving distressed companies, there may be 
little practical difference between debt and equity.  When a highly 
leveraged company cannot pay its bills, the entire capital structure 
is, for all intents and purposes, equity, and calling a particular part 
of its capital structure debt is an exercise in hope over 
experience.343 The I.R.S. needs the tools to prevent insiders and 
other related parties from avoiding taxes by mischaracterizing 
equity investments as debt in such circumstances.344 At the same 
time, excessive ambiguity is undesirable because distressed 
corporations need  as much certainty and guidance as reasonably 
possible in ascertaining the tax consequences of their financing 
arrangements.345 The 2016 regulations balance these competing 
interests and largely succeed where its predecessors failed.346 
                                                                                                     
 342. See M.V., Corporate Tax Avoidance: The Price Isn’t Right, ECONOMIST: 
SCHUMPETER BLOG (Sept. 21, 2012, 7:23 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
schumpeter/2012/09/corporate-tax-avoidance (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (observing 
that large corporations push into legal grey areas with aggressive tax planning 
strategies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 343. See David Bagley, Liquidity is King in the Financial Structure of a 
Struggling Company, DAILY DAC (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.dailydac.com/ 
commercialbankruptcy/alternatives/articles/liquidity-is-king-financial-structure-
issues-in-advance-of-insolvency-proceedings (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (noting 
that a distress company’s capital structure can be highly relevant to whether the 
company will be able to continue operations) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 344. See Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Oct. 13, 2016) 
(“[T]oday’s final regulations narrowly target problematic earnings stripping 
transactions – transactions that generate deductions for interest payments on 
related-party debt that does not finance new investment in the United States—
while minimizing unintended consequences for regular business activities.”). 
 345. See David M. Driesen, Complexity and Simplicity in Law: A Review 
Essay (Cass R. Sustein, Simpler: The Future of Government (2013)), 45 ENVTL. L. 
181, 186 (2015) (noting that “most complexity commentators associate 
uncertainty with the proliferation of very specific rules”). 
 346. See supra Part VII (providing examples and analyzing the various 
governmental approaches to distinguishing debt from equity).  
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IX. Proposed Improvements and Recommendations 
Any proposed improvements to the documentation 
requirements under the 2016 regulations should focus on 
providing greater certainty to corporations while preserving the 
ability of the government to challenge abusive corporate behavior. 
This means addressing two provisions in the regulations that give 
the government the authority to recharacterize instruments if it 
determines there was no reasonable prospect of repayment347 or if 
the parties do not conduct themselves as debtors or creditors.348 
The final regulations, while eliminating broad provisions of the 
initial proposed regulations, retain the government’s open-ended 
ability to recharacterize a broad array of financial instruments as 
equity in the documentation requirements, without providing 
sufficient guidance to corporations.349  
If the government finds there was no reasonable prospect of 
repayment of capital invested in a corporation at the time of the 
transaction,350 or that the parties are not conducting themselves 
as traditional debtors and creditors,351  it can treat the instrument 
as equity.352 But the regulations do not set forth any guidance 
regarding how to make these determinations and presumably 
would look to common law tests for instruction.353 But we see how 
common law tests resulted in inconsistent results in this area of 
the law.354 More specific guidance is needed that sets forth in detail 
                                                                                                     
 347. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii) (2016) (prescribing the third 
indebtedness factor that a corporation must meet to be in compliance with the 
documentation requirements). 
 348. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv) (setting forth the fourth indebtedness factor a 
corporation must retain in their documents). 
 349. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2) (presenting broad indebtedness factors).  
 350. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii) (“There must be written documentation 
containing information establishing that, as of the date of issuance of the 
applicable interest . . . the issuer’s financial position supported a reasonable 
expectation that the  issuer intended to, and would be able to, meet its 
obligations . . . .”).  
 351. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv) (providing that actions evidencing a debtor-
creditor relationship include payment of principal and interest, enforcement of 
default and similar events).  
 352. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2) (requiring a corporation’s documents to include 
proof of the indebtedness factors prescribed in the regulation).  
 353. See id. (furnishing broad explanations of the indebtedness factors).  
 354. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 408 (stipulating that courts arrive at 
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the characteristics of debt that must be present to avoid 
recharacterization of an instrument as equity.  
In order to bring greater certainty to the law, the regulations 
should provide greater specificity regarding the standards for 
determining what constitutes reasonable certainty of repayment 
at the time a loan is extended. Rather than a rigid balance sheet 
test, however, this should involve a practical analysis of the 
company’s current and future liquidity; cash flow; fair market, 
value rather than the book value of all of its assets (both balance 
sheet and off-balance sheet assets); and business prospects as of 
the time the instrument is created. Financial statements often fail 
to provide a complete picture of a company’s financial health, 
particularly for companies in the technology industry, companies 
with significant amounts of intangible assets whose fair market 
value does not appear on the balance sheet, companies with off 
balance sheet assets, or companies in financial distress whose 
assets are quickly declining in value.355 To obtain an accurate and 
independent assessment of the likelihood of repayment, 
corporations should obtain fairness opinions or similar types of 
independent evaluations of their financial condition from an 
independent party (i.e., an investment bank, commercial bank, or 
consulting firm) at the time the loan is made.356 The Treasury 
Department would be free to challenge such analyses.357 
                                                                                                     
different results depending on which common law factors the court wishes to 
stress).  
 355. See TIMOTHY J. GALLAGHER & JOSEPH D. ANDREW, FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 88 (Freeload Press 4th ed. 2007) (1997) 
(assessing financial health and finding that “for some firms the financial 
statements do not provide the entire picture”). 
 356. See Fairness Opinion, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/f/fairness-opinion.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (defining a fairness 
opinion as “[a] report evaluating the facts of a merger or acquisition” which 
“examines the fairness of the offered acquisition price”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 357. Under the 2016 regulations, a corporation may provide additional 
documentation to supplement the required documents, but in no circumstance 
will it be able to act as a substitute for the required documents. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.385-2(c)(1)(i) (explaining the role of additional documents provided to the 
Treasury Department). Third party reports or analysis on whether the issuer 
would be able to meet its obligations pursuant to the terms of the loan are not 
taken into account if an assertion is made “under law[s] governing an inquiry or 
proceeding with respect to the EGI.” Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(iii)(C).  
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With respect to whether parties conduct themselves as 
genuine debtors and creditors, parties seeking debt treatment 
should specify their respective rights and obligations in an 
indenture or note whose provisions are strictly followed and 
enforced. The common law tests placed significant emphasis on 
parties enforcing or waiving traditional creditors’ rights when 
re-characterizing certain instruments as equity.358 If parties want 
to avoid the Treasury Department rewriting their contracts, they 
should not only “talk the talk” of lenders but “walk the walk” and 
behave like lenders. The more punctilious they are about behaving 
like they really loaned and borrowed money, the more difficult it 
will be for the government to claim they did not.359 Form only 
subsumes substance where substance is illusory; if substance is 
real, it should be respected. Drafting agreements with specificity 
and conducting themselves in accordance with their agreements, 
corporations should minimize the chances that the government 
will rewrite their contracts retroactively under the broad 
discretion granted by the new regulations.  
X. Conclusion 
The 2016 Regulations are the end of decades of government 
efforts to develop an effective approach to distinguishing debt from 
equity. The regulations seek to provide corporations with 
reasonable clarity while giving the government the ability to 
challenge abusive transactions. The regulations grant the 
government broad powers to recharacterize corporate transactions 
under two standards contained in the documentation 
requirements: (1) whether it is reasonable to expect repayment of 
an instrument at the time is entered into,360 and (2) whether the 
parties conduct themselves as true debtors and creditors.361 While 
                                                                                                     
 358. See supra Part IV.B (explicating how the common law determined 
whether there was an objective determination of an intent to create a 
debtor-creditor relationship).  
 359. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2 (a)(1) (2016) (specifying that the documentation 
requirement is necessary “for the proper determination of whether certain 
instruments will be treated as indebtedness for federal tax purposes”).  
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv). 
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an important and useful step forward, these standards should be 
improved. The first standard lacks specificity, imposing on 
corporations a burden to make the case for the type of treatment 
of their transactions that they seek. The common law provides 
guidance on the second standard;362 corporations should conduct 
themselves in accordance with long-established norms of 
debt-creditor relationships to prevent the government from 
challenging them. Overall, the 2016 Regulations strike a fair 
balance between providing corporations with the type of clarity 
that allows them to plan their affairs and giving the government 
the ability to challenge abusive transactions that deprive it of tax 
revenue.  
While the new regulations are in place, there is a possibility 
that more change is on the way as part of the Trump 
administration’s tax reform efforts363 and litigation challenging 
the lawfulness of the 2016 Regulations.364 On April 21, 2017, 
President Trump signed an executive order directing the Treasury 
Department to review “significant” regulations that were issued in 
2016 and 2017 to determine if the regulations are too expensive, 
too complex, or exceed the IRS’s statutory authority.365 The order 
does not define “significant,” but does state that any earlier 
determination under Executive Order 12866 (Sept. 30, 1993) or 
whether a tax regulation is “significant” will not be controlling.366 
The § 385 regulations may come under review pursuant to this 
Order, though at this time the fate of these regulations is 
unknown, as are the prospects for serious tax reform. Further, on 
                                                                                                     
 362. See supra Part IV.B (presenting the evidentiary factors the common law 
uses in order to determine whether there was an objective determination of an 
intent to create a debtor-creditor relationship).  
 363. See Exec. Order No. 13789, 3 C.F.R. § 2 (2017) (“In furtherance of the 
policy described in section 1 of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury 
(Secretary) shall immediately review all significant tax regulations issued by the 
Department of the Treasury on or after January 1, 2016 . . . .” ). 
 364. See Chris Sanders, U.S. Court Strikes Down Obama-Era Rule on Tax 
Inversions, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 29, 2017, 11:03 PM), https://money.usnews.com/ 
investing/news/articles/2017-09-29/us-court-strikes-down-obama-era-rule-on-
tax-inversions (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (reporting on the litigation) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 365. See Exec. Order No. 13789, 3 C.F.R. § 2 (2017) (providing for review of 
Obama-Era rules on taxes).  
 366. Id.  
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September 29, 2017 “a federal court in Texas ruled that the Obama 
administration acted unlawfully last year when its Treasury 
Department cracked down on U.S. companies that try to reduce 
their U.S. taxes by rebasing abroad, in a process known as 
inversion.”367 While the lawfulness of § 385 is beyond the scope of 
this Note, both Trump’s Order and the federal district court 
decision from Texas raise questions regarding the ultimate fate of 
the § 385 regulations. Corporations are already adjusting to the 
new regulations and this uncertainty needs to be resolved as soon 
as possible. For the moment, however, the new § 385 regulations 
are the only game in town.  
                                                                                                     
 367. Sanders, supra note 364. 
